【作者】 马淼淼； 孟卫东； 黄波；

【Author】 MA Miao-miao;MENG Wei-dong;HUANG Bo;School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University;

【机构】 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院；

【摘要】 本文以双积分政策及消费者对新能源汽车的技术偏好为背景,研究单个新能源汽车制造商和单个核心零部件供应商组成的供应链中,收入共享契约和谈判权力对供应链技术研发决策及成员利润的影响。研究发现:双积分政策的实施和消费者对新能源汽车的技术偏好总能刺激核心零部件供应商进行技术研发,且两家企业总可以从中获利。收入共享能使核心零部件供应商提高技术研发,其利润增加;在双方通过谈判决定共享收入比例时,核心零部件供应商若进行研发,其所享有的收入共享比例高于谈判权力,当他拥有全部谈判权力时,会独占供应链全部收入;而当汽车制造商拥有全部谈判权力时,仍会与供应商共享收入,这对双方都有利。与不共享收入相比,核心零部件供应商总可以从谈判收入共享中受益,而汽车制造商只有在对方的谈判能力较弱时才能受益。最后,当且仅当供应商拥有全部谈判权力时,收入共享契约才能完美协调供应链。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the dual-credit policy and consumers’ technical preference for new energy vehicles, this paper studies the impact of revenue-sharing contract and negotiation power on technology R&D decisions and members’ profits in the supply chain consisting of a single new energy automobile manufacturer and a single core component supplier. The results show that the implementation of the dual-credit policy and consumers’ preference for new energy vehicles can always stimulate the core component supplier to carry out technology research and development, and the two companies can always profit from it. Revenue-sharing contract enables core component supplier to improve technology research and development and increase their profits. When the two parties decide the revenue-sharing ratio through negotiation, if the core component supplier conducts R&D, its revenue-sharing ratio is higher than the negotiating power. When it has all the negotiating power, it will monopolize all the revenue of the supply chain. And when automobile manufacturer has full negotiating power, it still shares revenues with suppliers, which benefits both sides. Core parts supplier always benefits from negotiating revenue-sharing as opposed to not revenue-sharing, whereas automobile manufacturer benefits only when the other side is less able to negotiate. Finally, revenue-sharing contract perfectly coordinates the supply chain if and only if the supplier has full negotiating power.更多还原