【作者】 汪秀秀； 张晨； 董晓君； 郑宝红；

【机构】 合肥工业大学管理学院；

【摘要】 会计准则的日益完善和监管环境的日趋严格使管理层倾向于通过操控真实交易活动来调整盈余,作为公司治理重要组成部分的独立董事承担着监督管理层行为的责任。论文基于销售操控视角,研究了技术独立董事对真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:技术独立董事可以通过抑制管理层销售操控行为提高盈余信息质量,聘请男性、高教育背景、身兼数职的技术独立董事更有利于监督职能的发挥。进一步研究发现,技术独立董事个人特征间存在交互作用且对抑制真实盈余管理具有促进效果。结论从真实盈余管理角度为制定和完善董事制度提供政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the increasing accounting standards and the increasingly stringent regulatory environment, the management is more inclined to manipulate the real trading activities to adjust the surplus. Independent directors who are responsible for supervising the behavior of management are an important part of corporate governance. From the perspective of sales control,this paper studies the effect of independent directors on the real earnings management. The empirical results show that the technology independent directors can indentify management sales control and efficiently constrain real earnings management. If technology independent directors who are male and high educational increase the number of part-time job,the effect of supervisory is better.And the results confirm the interaction between the characteristics of the technology independent directors can promote the effect of suppressingreal earnings management. The paper will provide policy suggestions for formulating and perfecting the directors system.更多还原