【作者】 刘德海； 周婷婷； 王维国；

【Author】 LIU De-hai;ZHOU Ting-ting;WANG Wei-guo;Center of Econometric Analysis and Forecasting,Dongbei University of Finance & Economics;School of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance & Economics;

【机构】 东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心； 东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院；

【摘要】 恐怖主义成为世界各国面临的重大挑战,但是中美反恐国际合作却面临着美国在反恐问题上采取"双重标准"的问题。本文考虑到反恐国际合作的战略互惠关系和心理效用,建立了反恐国际合作双重标准问题的序贯互惠博弈模型。分析了当事国之间在构建长期互惠的反恐合作关系,与采取"双重标准"或搭便车行为获取单方面收益之间的权衡,剖析了反恐国际合作失败的主要原因。研究表明,影响反恐合作的主要因素是双方对战略互惠关系的重视程度(互惠敏感系数)、双重标准或搭便车的单方面获益、反恐合作成本等。增加反恐合作效用、降低合作成本和双重标准等单方面行动获益,有助于实现反恐国际合作。更多还原

【Abstract】 Terrorism becomes the great challenges among various countries.However,Chinese-American anti-terrorism cooperation is facing the double standard taken by American government.Considering the strategy reciprocal relationship and psychological utility,the sequential reciprocal game model about the double standard problem in the international anti-terrorism cooperation is built in this paper.The trade-off between the long reciprocal relationship of anti-terrorism cooperation and the unilateral income derived is analyzed from the double standard or free rider,and then the major reasons of failure in international antiterrorism cooperation are discussed.The results show that the main influences include the reciprocal sensitive coefficient,the unilateral income,and the cost of anti-terrorism cooperation.It helps to reach the international anti-terrorism cooperation that improving cooperative income,reducing the cooperative cost and unilateral income derived from double standard and free rider behavior.更多还原