【作者】 范瑛； 平新乔；

【Author】 YING FAN XINQIAO PING (Peking University)

【机构】 北京大学中国经济研究中心；

【摘要】 本文用一个简单的两期动态模型分析年薪制下的显性激励和隐性激励。本文明确引入"灰色收入"作为企业经营者收入的一部分,定义广义的"职业生涯考虑",同时,放弃了完全竞争市场的假设。通过对现行年薪制下经理考虑"灰色收入"时显性激励和隐性激励的共同作用的分析,本文解释了如下经济现象:虽然现行的年薪制引入了显性的工资合约,但并不一定使得经理的努力程度提高,而且也不能解决灰色收入问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 We analyze the explicit and implicit incentives under the new salary system in a simple 2-period dynamic model.We consider gray income as part of the manager s income and de- fine the generalized career concern",and give up the assumption of completely competitive mar- ket.By analyzing the effect of explicit and implicit incentives when the manager cares about gray income,we show that even explicit wage contract is introduced by the system,the manager’s first-period effort doesn t necessarily increase and in no circumstance will the manager quit from getting semi-legal gray income.更多还原