【作者】 周方召； 周正； 曲振涛； 孙凯；

【机构】 浙江大学经济学院； 哈尔滨商业大学经济研究中心；

【摘要】 近年来中国上市公司的董事薪酬和高管薪酬迅速增长并引起社会广泛关注,社会各界对于董事和高管薪酬增长趋同的现象展开了热烈讨论。本文收集整理了2005-2008年中国上市公司前三名董事薪酬、高管薪酬和其他相关数据,针对中国当前存在大量国有控股上市公司的现实情况和内部董事拥有公司控制权的事实,采用公司一年度的面板数据分析方法,研究了董事薪酬、高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的关系。通过计量分析,本文研究发现董事、尤其是内部董事与高管之间存在着利益共谋,进一步研究表明这种共谋在国有控股上市公司中存在着差别,其他性质的上市公司中也存在着利益的共谋;此外,高管薪酬与公司会计绩效之间存在着正向的关系,但控制了一些公司特征之后,这种联系并不显著,独立董事制度等公司治理机制逐渐开始产生影响,但限于公司实际控制权仍然掌握在内部董事和高管人员手中,独立董事的监督作用尚未得到完全发挥,中国上市公司仍然存在着内部人控制的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Directors compensation and executive compensation of listed firms in China has been increasing dramatically in recent years,and all circles talk about this phenomenon passionately.We hypothesize there exist such one kind of mutual collusion relationship when considering the consistent correlation of executive compensation and director’s compensation.Based on collecting data from listed firms for the period between 2005 and 2008,we investigate and examine the relationship of executive compensation,director compensation and firm performance.By using Pooled regress,Fixed-effect regress,we find that directors’ compensation doesn’t take an effect on firm performance though it is positively correlated significantly.Although ROA is positively related with executive compensation,the relationship is no significantly after controlling some company characters.The further test finds out there are difference depending on different property of ownership.The effect of independent directors is initiatory coming to being,but the problem of insider’s manipulation still exists in China because of higher managerial power of board and executive.更多还原