【作者】 刘启亮； 李增泉； 姚易伟；

【机构】 武汉大学经济与管理学院； 上海财经大学会计学院； 香港城市大学商学院；

【摘要】 本文试图通过提供一个关于投资者保护、金字塔结构与控制权私利的具有较大创新性的理论解释框架,来探讨其潜在的内在逻辑关系,并以中国证券市场具有代表性的格林柯尔案例为例进行分析。本文认为由于投资者保护的差异,投资者籍此事前形成了关于经济公正的不同预期,据此进行不同的投资行为选择。在投资者保护较好的环境下,公司治理兼顾经济公正与投资者个体的效率,从而诱使投资者分散投资,以规避风险等。然而,在投资者保护较弱的情况下,公司治理就倾向于强势原则,诱使有实力的股东集中投资,进而通过控制权放大效应形成复杂的金字塔结构,籍此进行掏空和寻租等以获取控制权私利。同时,为了隐藏获取的控制权私利,强势的控股股东会利用金字塔结构的复杂性、对剩余公司治理的控制等有利条件,通过盈余管理等手段操纵会计信息,降低财务信息的透明度。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper tries to analyse the interrelationships among investor protection, pyramid ownership structure and private benefit of control through building a framework for this kind of analysis. We conduct a case study of Greencool Company, which is a listed company in China. It thinks that the difference in investor protection lead to different expectations about economic justice, and these different expectation of investors will affect their investment choice and the way of their investment behavior. Specifically, when investors-protection is good, corporate governance can enhance both economic justice and efficiency, therefore, an investor will behave rationally trying to diversify and reduce risk.. However, when investors-protection is bad, corporate governance will address efficiency but scarify economic justice. That means in such situations, the stronger is protected more. Therefore, the more powerful party or person will be attracted to be the controlling shareholders. And always complicated pyramid structure, earning management are employed by these controlling shareholders to do tunneling and rent seeking to take this opportunities provided by weak investor-protection.更多还原