【作者】 徐细雄； 淦未宇；

【Author】 XU Xi-xiong~1 GAN Wei-yu~2 (1. School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China; 2. School of Management, Southwest University of Political Science & Law, Chongqing 400031,China)

【机构】 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院； 西南政法大学管理学院；

【摘要】 从Holmstrom提出的多任务代理模型出发,分析了企业管理者面临的纵向多任务特性,并将管理者投入划分为追求当期财务绩效和追求企业能力两个维度,以此为基础构建了基于多任务代理模型的管理者动态报酬契约。结果表明,基于多任务代理模型的管理者动态报酬契约相对于传统静态报酬契约具有明显的帕累托效率改进,有利于诱导管理者在不同维度上合理分配投入,避免短期效应的发生。最后,运用K集团公司的简单案例对其应用进行了简单分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Starting from the Multi-Task Agent Model originated by Holmstrom,this paper analyzes the multi-task speciality of managers and divides manager’s effort into two dimension:the strategic management action which pur- sues enterprise’s core competition ability and operating management action which is in pursuit of current perform- ance.Based on it,this study constructs manager’s dynamic payment contract,and the model shows that thep are- to-efficiency of dynamic model is better than traditional static incentive model,and can induce the reasonable distri- bution of manager’s effort.At last,this paper discusses the application of the model through a case of K company.更多还原