节点文献
不对称双寡头企业半合作创新模式研究
A Study on Asymmetric Duopoly with Semi-collusion
【Author】 SUN Cai-hong~1 QI Jian-guo~2 YU Hui~3 (1.Apllied Technology College Chongqing Technology & Business University,Chongqing 400020,China; 2.Institute Quantitative & Technicial Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China; 3.College of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)
【机构】 重庆工商大学应用技术学院; 中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所; 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【摘要】 本文研究不对称性(初始成本、创新率、溢出水平)对半合作创新模式下的企业间的研发投入、产量、利润对比以及社会福利水平造成的影响.我们建立了该创新模式下的不对称双寡头博弈模型,运用数值模拟对模型的均衡解进行比较分析后发现:具有初始成本优势的企业研发投入、产量、利润较高;具有创新率优势的企业研发投入、产量较高,但利润的相对大小与溢出水平有关;溢出不对称情况下,溢出小的企业研发投入较低,产量、利润较高;当初始成本差距越小、创新率差距越小、企业溢出都非常低或非常高时,社会福利较高.
【Abstract】 This paper aims at analyzing the effect of asymmetry on R&D expenditures,output, profit and welfare for two agents of different initial cost,innovation rate and spillover with semi-col- lusion.Asymmetric duopolistic is proposed.Simulations show that the agent with lower initial cost has higer R&D expenditures,output and profit;the agent with higher innovation rate also has higer R&D expenditure and output.Whether its profit is higer depends on the two agents’s spillover.The agent with lower spillover always has lower R&D expenditure,but higer output and profit.The lower the difference of the two agnts’ initial cost is,the lower that of innovation rate is,and the nearer to 0 or 1 the two agents’ spillover is,the higher welfare is.
【Key words】 asymmetric agents; semi-collusion; game theory; numerical simmulation;
- 【会议录名称】 和谐发展与系统工程——中国系统工程学会第十五届年会论文集
- 【会议名称】中国系统工程学会第十五届年会
- 【会议时间】2008-10
- 【会议地点】中国江西南昌
- 【分类号】F272;F224
- 【主办单位】中国系统工程学会