【作者】 许艳芳； 文旷宇；

【机构】 中国人民大学商学院；

【摘要】 本文从掏空的视角研究控制权安排与上市公司长期并购绩效之间的关系。研究发现:控股股东持股比例越低,上市公司并购绩效越差;控股股东和上市公司之间的控制链条越长,公司的长期并购绩效越差;其他大股东对控股股东的制衡能力越弱,上市公司长期并购绩效越差。本文的研究结论有助于从控制权安排的角度规范我国上市公司的并购行为。更多还原

【Abstract】 We study the effect of control rights arrangement on the long-term acquirers’ performance from the tunneling perspective in this paper. Our empirical evidence reveals three points. First,the acquirer’ performance is worse when ultimate controller’ cash flow right is low. Second,the longer the chain between the ultimate controller and listed firm,the worse the performance of acquirer is. Third,when other big shareholders of listed firm possess strong equity restriction,the performance is relatively better. The results of this paper may contribute to supervise the M&A activities from the control rights arrangement perspective in China.更多还原