【作者】 张秀娥； 张金山； 徐兴；

【Author】 Zhang Xiue1, Zhang Jinshan1, Xu Xing2 (1. Jilin University, P.R.China, 130012; 2. commission for discipline inspection of Changchun, P.R.China, 130012)

【机构】 吉林大学商学院； 长春市纪律检查委员会；

【摘要】 无论是基于委托代理理论还是利益相关者理论所形成的公司治理制度,尽管公司治理主体的内含正在不断扩大,但都将经理层作为各方利益受损的根源,旨在通过对经理层行为的约束,保证股东及其他利益相关者的权益。实际上,作为企业经营性人力资本的所有者,经理层同样有动力去约束企业其他利益相关者特别是大股东的非伦理行为,单纯将经理层作为治理的客体来约束,忽视了经理层作为治理主体的作用。本文从经理层人力资本的特征出发,探讨经理层对大股东侵占及其他利益相关者非伦理行为进行监督制衡的可能性及其作用机制,以期对充分认识并发挥经理层的作用,完善公司治理有所启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 Although the subject of governance’s extent is expanding gradually, The systems of corporate governance formed whether by the principal-agent theory or the Stakeholders theory make the managers as the source of damage to the interests of all parties to the company, aiming to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders through the constraints to the managers. In fact, as a owner of business human capital, managers also have the motivation to restrain non-ethical behavior of other stakeholders, especially large shareholders. Simply making managers as the object of governance to restrain neglects the role of subject of governance. This thesis will explore the possibility and action mechanism of the managers’ Supervision and counterbalance to the non-ethical behavior of the majority shareholder and other stakeholders begainning with the analysis of the characteristics of managers’ human capital. We hope this thesis can make an inspiration on realising managers’ role and perfecting Corperate Governance.更多还原