预算目标、薪酬契约与经理人激励

【作者】 潘飞； 程明；

【机构】 上海财经大学会计与财务研究院上海财经大学会计学院；

【摘要】 在我国,国企改革一直是我国经济转型的重点。由计划经济向市场经济的转型过程中,国有企业经理人更有能力决定企业的绩效水平。这就要求企业建立有效的激励与约束机制,而经理人的业绩评价与薪酬契约就是激励机制的两个重要方面。政府的高度关注和市场的激烈竞争,导致国有企业建立以预算方式为主的完善的业绩评价标准。但由于国有企业薪酬管制的存在,造成薪酬契约改革的缓慢发展。我们通过翻阅2002年上市公司年报,手工收集资料将国有企业经理人薪酬契约分为固定工资型和激励型。利用实证回归分析,我们发现采取激励型薪酬契约的上市公司业绩更好,更有效地激励经理人努力工作。这说明我国应逐步放松国有企业的薪酬管制,完善经理人激励与约束机制,促进国企的深入改革。更多还原

【Abstract】 In our country,the innovation of state-owned enterprises(SOE) is the emphasis in economic transference.While transferring from planned economy to market economy,the enterprises need to set up available incentive systems,in which two important impacts are performance evaluation and compensation contracts.The SOEs have established the standard of performance evaluation through budgeting,but the innovation of compensation contract developed slowly because of compensation regulation.We partition the listed enterprises into two kinds: fixed-pay contract and incentive contract.We find the performance of the listed enterprises adopting the incentive contracts is prior to the others,which indicates the incentive contracts have better incentive effect.So we should release the compensation regulation in SOE and enhance the incentive system,which can accelerate the innovation of SOE.更多还原