【作者】 佟健；

【Author】 JIAN TONG (Liao Ning University)

【机构】 辽宁大学比较经济体制研究中心；

【摘要】 本文利用职业生涯考虑的模型分析了地方政府的投资激励。在这个模型中,假定中央政府不知道地方政府官员的能力,他根据地方政府过去GDP增长率来评估地方政府官员的能力,并且按照对地方政府官员能力的预期来安排升迁。地方政府官员出于职业生涯的考虑,将自己的努力更多地投向能够带来GDP增长的工作中,如:争取项目、增加投资、吸引外资。通过提高地方的GDP增长率,来向中央表明自己是高能力的。地方政府官员由于追求自己职业升迁导致的投资冲动,尽管会促进地方GDP的增长,但是也会导致地方投资过热,从而影响到市场波动,地方政府不再是中央政府宏观调控政策的执行者,而是市场波动的根源,应该成为宏观调控的对象。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper uses a career concerns model to analyze investment incentives of local government. Suppose central government in this model doesn’t know the ability of the local government’s official, it assesses the ability of the official according to past GDP growth rate and promotes him by forming the expectation about the official’s ability. The incentive of career concerns makes the official put in effort in the jobs that can bring a GDP growth, such as Fighting for projects, increasing an investment and drawing on foreign capital. The official shows central government that he has a high ability by a high GDP growth rate. The official’s signaling by investment will promote the growth of GDP, but will also cause the hot investment and the market fluctuation. The official is not an executor of the policy any more, but the source of market fluctuation. He should be controlled in the macroeconomic adjustment.更多还原