【作者】 张钦红； 赵泉午； 熊中楷；

【Author】 ZHANG Qin-hong~1 ZHAO Quan-wu~1 XIONG Zhong-kai~2 (1.Business School,Shantou University,Shantou 515063,China;2.College of Economy and Business Administration,Chongqing Universitv,Chongqing 400044 China)

【机构】 汕头大学商学院； 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院；

【摘要】 无缺陷退货是企业退货的一个重要组成部分。在由单个制造商和单个经销商构成的分散式供应链中,经销商通过增加销售努力可以降低无缺陷退货,但由此产生的收益却由制造商享有,所以经销商缺乏降低无缺陷退货的积极性,整个供应链也就难以实现协调。本文设计了一种惩罚合同机制可以实现整个供应链关于无缺陷退货的协调。最后通过实例分析研究了参数的变化对合同及供应链协调效果的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 False failure returns are the important part of a firm’s product returns.In a decentralized supply chaincomposed with a manufacturer and a retailer,the benefits from the reduction of the false failure returns are mainlyoccupied by the manufacturer.While the retailer bears the cost of reducing such returns.So the retailer has no en-thusiasm to make efforts to reduce such returns and thus the supply chain can’t achieve coordination.In this paperwe present a kind of penalty contract which can achieve supply chain coordination.At last,we use a numerical a-nalysis to study the influence of the parameters on penalty contract and the benefits of adopting this contract.更多还原