【作者】 王冬梅；

【导师】 曲秉春；

【作者基本信息】 东北师范大学 ， 企业管理， 2024， 硕士

【摘要】 “参股混改”这一概念的提出主要源于国家政策文件和实践经验,尽管国有资本参股的政策框架已经确立,但对于其具体对上市民营企业违规行为的影响机制,以及其在实践中的效果,学术界相关的研究仍然存在不足。因此,本研究旨在通过深入挖掘国有资本参股这一经济现象,探讨其对上市民营企业违规行为的影响以及可能存在的影响机制。这既对指导企业规范经营和制定相关政策具有重要的现实意义,又可以帮助丰富有关国有资本参股对企业违规行为影响的理论,为后续进一步的实证研究提供理论基础。针对上述问题,本文以我国2010-2022年A股上市民营企业的面板数据为依据,分别构建OLS、Probit、Logit和部分可观测双变量Probit模型,研究国有资本参股对企业违规行为的影响,并进一步细分不同类型企业来探究上述相关关系的适用情境,又以同年度同行业企业是否存在国有大股东为0-1变量进行倾向得分匹配以检验其内生性。在此基础上,本文又进行了行业竞争程度和融资约束的调节效应检验以及企业透明度、机构投资者持股、审计质量和财务稳健性的中介机制检验。本文的研究结果表明,国有参股大股东能够显著抑制民营企业违规,抑制企业的违规倾向、同时提高企业违规被稽查发现的概率。在进行异质性分析后发现,国有参股大股东对企业违规的抑制作用在不同子群体中效果有所不同,这种抑制性主要在制造业企业、上市五年以上发展相对成熟的企业以及行业中资产规模相对较大的企业中有显著体现。在此基础上,本文进一步运用倾向得分匹配法在同行业范围内寻找实验组和对照组,在缩小样本匹配分组后进行再次回归,所得到的国有资本参股抑制民营企业违规的回归结果依然显著。进一步地,进行调节效应检验后发现,在竞争激烈程度高的行业和融资约束程度高的企业中,国有参股大股东能够更有效地抑制民营企业违规,即国有参股大股东可以降低经营风险和财务风险对企业违规造成的不利影响。最后,进行中介机制检验发现,国有参股大股东对民营企业违规的抑制路径有:加强治理提高企业透明度、强化监督质量聘用更专业的会计师事务所审计、降低企业风险提高财务稳健性等,即国有参股大股东能够通过提高民营企业透明度、聘用更专业的会计师事务所、提高财务稳健性来抑制企业的违规行为。由以上的实证结果,我们得到如下结论:民营企业混合所有制改革建设中的参股混改这一改革形式不会降低正式制度对企业违规的有效性,而是通过强化监督、优化治理、改善经营等促进了我国上市民营企业在遵规守法道路上健康发展。本文从异质性股权结构层面丰富了我国上市民营企业有关混合所有制改革中国有资本参股的经济后果方面的文献,特别是对国有资本参股这一混合所有制改革形式在不同类型的民营企业中对抑制违规所存在的优势和差异性进行了深入挖掘,为上市民营企业混改效果的提升、资本市场的平稳发展提供了有针对性的政策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 The concept of "equity mixed ownership reform" is mainly derived from national policy documents and practical experience.Although the policy framework for stateowned capital equity participation has been established,there is still insufficient research in the academic community on its specific impact mechanism on the violation behavior of listed private enterprises and its effectiveness in practice.Therefore,this study aims to explore the impact of state-owned capital participation on the illegal behavior of listed private enterprises and the possible impact mechanisms by delving deeper into the economic phenomenon of state-owned capital participation.This has important practical significance for guiding enterprises to standardize their operations and formulate relevant policies,and can also help enrich the theoretical understanding of the impact of state-owned capital participation on corporate violations,providing a theoretical basis for further empirical research in the future.Based on the panel data of private enterprises listed on A-shares in China from2010 to 2022,this article constructs OLS,Probit,Logit,and partially observable bivariate Probit models to study the impact of state-owned capital participation on corporate violations,and further subdivides different types of enterprises to explore the applicable scenarios of the above relationships,Using the 0-1 variable of whether there are state-owned major shareholders in the same industry and enterprise in the same year,propensity score matching is conducted to test its endogeneity.On this basis,this article also conducted a regulatory effect test on industry competition and financing constraints,as well as an intermediary mechanism test on enterprise transparency,institutional investor shareholding,audit quality,and financial robustness.The research results of this article indicate that state-owned major shareholders can significantly suppress violations by private enterprises,suppress their tendency to violate regulations,and increase the probability of violations being detected by inspections.After conducting heterogeneity analysis,it was found that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate violations varies among different subgroups.This inhibitory effect is mainly reflected in manufacturing enterprises,relatively mature enterprises that have been listed for more than five years,and enterprises with relatively large asset sizes in the industry.On this basis,this article further uses propensity score matching method to search for experimental and control groups within the same industry scope.After reducing the sample matching group,a regression analysis is conducted again,and the regression results of state-owned capital participation inhibiting private enterprise violations are still significant.Furthermore,after conducting a moderation effect test,it was found that in industries with high competition and enterprises with high financing constraints,stateowned shareholders can more effectively suppress violations by private enterprises,that is,state-owned shareholders can reduce the adverse effects of operational and financial risks on corporate violations.Finally,conducting an intermediary mechanism test,it was found that the paths for state-owned shareholders to suppress violations by private enterprises include strengthening governance and improving corporate transparency.Based on the above empirical results,we can draw the following conclusion: the participation in mixed ownership reform in the construction of mixed ownership in private enterprises will not reduce the effectiveness of the formal system in addressing corporate violations.Instead,it promotes the healthy development of listed private enterprises in China on the path of compliance and law by strengthening supervision,optimizing governance,and improving operations.This article enriches the literature on the economic consequences of mixed ownership reform in Chinese listed private enterprises from the perspective of heterogeneous equity structure.In particular,it delves into the advantages and differences of state-owned capital participation in mixed ownership reform in suppressing violations in different types of private enterprises,providing targeted policy references for the improvement of mixed ownership reform effects in listed private enterprises and the stable development of the capital market.更多还原