【作者】 王宁；

【导师】 张安录；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 随着城市化快速推进,以土地征收和出让为主的农地城市流转面临内外环境的双向压力。从内部来看,土地征收与土地出让涉及农民、村集体经济组织、地方政府、中央政府等多主体,农民和村集体的谈判能力相对较弱,收益分配空间受到压缩;从外部环境来看,高速的城镇化引致的土地需求,加快农地城市流转和增量土地扩张,加剧土地收益分配矛盾。中央地方财政分权,驱动地方政府农地城市流转并催生土地财政。因此,在高速城镇化、工业化背景下,探讨土地征收、土地出让中公平合理的土地收益分配,特别是如何保护集体与农民的土地权益是学术界和政府关注的重要课题。本研究首先评价长江经济带126地市土地征收和出让中的收益分配现状,并从收益量和分配结构两方面展开分析;其次,基于农地综合价值从土地发展权和主体贡献风险(合作博弈夏普利值法)双视角对长江经济带11个主要城市的均衡收益分配范围进行探讨。最终,根据我国当前土地收益分配的制度框架提出改善收益分配现状的政策建议。研究结论如下:(1)现行土地收益分配下集体与农民未获得土地增值收益,在分配中处于弱势地位。一方面,集体与农民收益来源于农地经济生产价值,政府收益来源于土地出让收益及相关税费,且土地征收补偿标准提升低于土地市场收益增值,导致集体与农民的收益占比在时间上呈现进一步缩减的趋势;另一方面,长江经济带城市间收益差异主要来自地方政府的差异贡献,其他主体对总体的差异贡献相对较小,地方政府对城市间收益差异有话语权。(2)长江经济带土地收益分配差异明显,下游>上游>中游。无论是分配量还是分配结构,长江经济带内部均存在较大差异,特别是在分配结构上已经突破当前我国居民收入分配差异。在空间上,土地收益总体呈现下游>上游>中游的布局,形成东西“双核”集聚和中部延伸带;在时间上,上游与中下游间的收益差异不断拉大,而中游与上下游的差异逐渐缩小,东西“双核”集聚的范围逐渐缩小并随时间的推移分散,形成空间集聚特征的分散化以及整体的均衡化。(3)以土地发展权作为收益分配基础,能实现收益分配均衡。长江经济带11个主要城市综合用地下集体农民和政府的平均分配比为31.3%:68.7%;各城市之间集体与农民和政府的收益分配差异显著,主要是土地市场发育状况。因此,以土地发展权作为收益分配的基础能够适应城市土地市场的动态变化,并使集体与农民和政府获得较均衡的土地收益。(4)土地隐形市场是政府土地收益流失的根源。根据合作博弈夏普利分析,无论是土地征收面积<35公顷还是≥35公顷时,政府对土地收益的贡献均最高。土地隐形交易影响政府收益,特别是地方政府土地收益,隐形市场交易产生的非法收益会弱化政府的关键作用。(5)清晰界定主体收益边界,均衡收益分配才能够保障集体与农民的合法权益。首先,以土地发展权为基础显著提升了集体与农民的收益比例,最低的收益分配占比达11.58%,工业用途对集体与农民的保障提升最明显,城市之间土地市场发育差异带来土地收益分配差异。其次,当土地征收面积<35公顷时,农民收益下限为7.31%,集体收益下限为5.13%,政府收益上限为85.49%;当土地征收面积≥35公顷时,农民收益分配下限为13.18%,集体收益分配占比为13.45%,地方政府实际收益占比较小仅占2%左右,中央政府的收益上限为71.79%。无论是以土地发展权为基础,还是按照主体对土地收益贡献均有利于保障集体与农民的合法收益。基于研究结论作者提出以下建议:(1)参考基准地价建立动态土地征收补偿标准,并充分考虑用地类型差异,从政策上保护集体与农民的合法权益,提升集体与农民在土地收益分配中的谈判能力。(2)联动和重点相结合,致力于内部均衡,重点优化区域差异,促进区域协调共同发展。(3)通过加强打击力度、提高违法成本和加强中央集权等方式,打击土地隐形市场交易,保障政府合法权益。(4)探索土地收益二次分配模式,明确基本分享比例,完善土地产权制度,重构土地收益分配格局。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid advancement of urbanization,the rural-urban land conversion,which is mainly based on land expropriation and transaction,is facing both internal and external pressures.In the internal environment,land expropriation and land transaction involve farmers,collectives,local governments,and central government,the ability of farmers and collectives to negotiate land revenue distribution is relatively weak.The space for revenue distribution has been compressed;In the external environment,the demand for land caused by rapid urbanization has intensified the rural-urban land conversion and the expansion of incremental land,further exacerbating the contradiction in the distribution of land revenue.The decentralization of central and local finance has driven the rural-urban land conversion of local government and spawned land finance.Therefore,in the context of high-speed urbanization and industrialization,it is an important topic of academic and government attention to discuss the reasonable distribution in land expropriation and transaction,especially how to protect the land rights and interests of collectives and farmers.Firstly,this study evaluates the current situation of revenue distribution in land expropriation and transfer in 126 cities of the Yangtze River Economic Belt,and analyzes it from the two aspects of revenue volume and distribution structure;Secondly,Based on the comprehensive value of agricultural land,based on the comprehensive value of farmland,this paper discusses the scope of balanced revenue distribution of 11 major cities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt from the perspective of land development right and subject contribution risk(the Shapley value method);Finally,according to the current institutional framework of country’s land revenue distribution,policy suggestions are put forward to improve the status quo of revenue distribution.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)Under the current distribution of land revenue,collectives and farmers have not obtained the value-added revenue of the land,and they are in a weak position in the distribution.On the one hand,the revenue of collectives and farmers comes from the economic production value of farmland,while the revenue of the government comes from the revenue of land transaction and related taxes and fees,and the improvement of land expropriation compensation standard is lower than the value-added of land market revenue,resulting in the further reduction of the revenue proportion of collectives and farmers in time;On the other hand,the difference in revenue between cities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt mainly comes from local governments,and the differences in other entities contribute relatively little to the overall difference,and local governments have a dominant voice in the distribution.(2)Land revenue distribution has obvious differences in the Yangtze River Economic Belt,downstream>upstream>midstream.Whether in the distribution quantity or distribution structure,there are large differences within the Yangtze River Economic Belt,there are large internal differences,especially in the distribution structure,which has broken through the current degree of difference in residents’income distribution in China.In space,the distribution structure presents the layout of downstream>upstream>midstream and has formed the East-West“dual core”agglomeration and the central extension belt;In time,the difference in revenue between the upstream and others is increasing,while the difference between the midstream and others is gradually narrowing,The scope of the East-West“dual core”agglomeration is gradually reduced and dispersed with the passage of time,which is manifested in the decentralization of spatial agglomeration characteristics and the overall equalization with the passage of time(3)Taking land development right as the basis for revenue distribution,which can achieve a balanced land revenue distribution.The comprehensive land average distribution ratio of the government,collectives and farmers is 68.7%:31.3%in the 11major cities of the Yangtze River Economy Belt;there are significant differences in the revenue distribution between the collectives,farmers and the government,mainly due to the development of the land market.Therefore,taking land development right as the basis for revenue distribution can adapt to the dynamic changes of the urban land market,and enable the collectives,farmers and government to obtain balanced land revenue.(4)The invisible land market is the source of the loss of government land revenue.According to the Shapley value method analysis of the cooperative game,whether the land expropriation area is less than 35 hm~2or more than 35 hm~2,the government’s contribution to land revenue is the highest.Invisible land transactions affect government revenue,especially local government land revenue,and the illegal revenue generated by invisible market transactions will weaken the key role of the government.(5)Only by clearly defining the subject’s revenue boundary and balanced revenue distribution can protect the legitimate rights and interests of collectives and farmers.Firstly,based on the land development right,the ratio of revenue to collectives and farmers has been significantly increased,the lowest proportion of revenue distribution reaching 11.58%,most obvious in industrial use.Differences in the development of land markets between cities have brought about differences in the distribution of land revenue.Secondly,when the land expropriation area is less than 35 hm~2,the lower proportion of farmers’revenue is 7.31%,the lower proportion of collectives’revenue is 5.13%,and the upper proportion of government revenue is 85.49%;When the land expropriation area is more than 35 hm~2,the lower proportion of farmers’revenue is13.18%,the proportion of collectives’revenue is 13.45%,the actual revenue of local governments only accounts for about 2%,and the upper proportion of the central government is 71.79%.Whether it is based on the land development right or the subject’s contribution,which are beneficial to protect the legitimate interests of collectives and farmers.Based on the research conclusions,the author puts forward the following suggestions:(1)Establish dynamic land expropriation compensation standards with reference to the benchmark land price,fully consider the differences of land use types,protect the legitimate rights and interests of collectives and farmers from the policy,and improve the negotiation ability of collectives and farmers in the distribution of land revenue.(2)Combine linkage and focus,commit to internal balance,focus on optimizing interregional differences,and promote regional coordinated and common development.(3)By strengthening the crackdown,increasing illegal costs and strengthening centralization,cracking down on invisible land market transactions and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the government.(4)Explore the secondary distribution mode of land revenue,clarify the basic sharing proportion,improve the land property right system,and reconstruct the distribution pattern of land revenue.更多还原