【作者】 黄丹；

【导师】 姜先登；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 税务， 2022， 硕士

【副题名】基于地级市层面的实证研究

【摘要】 近年来,我国地方政府债务规模加速增长,地方政府日益显著的债务问题成为整个债务问题的关键,一方面适度的地方政府债务可以弥补地方政府财力的不足,在完善基础设施建设、优化资源配置以及促进经济发展等方面发挥着重要作用;另一方面,地方政府过度举债不仅容易诱发宏观层面的财政金融风险,而且还可能会对微观企业行为产生深远影响。地方政府债务还款来源渠道单一,主要依靠土地出让金和税收收入,在土地资源有限且土地价格被严格管控的情况下,作为地方政府债务另一还款来源的税收收入,在地方政府借助杠杆撬动事权中发挥了无可替代的作用。企业作为地区经济发展的重要单元,一定程度上会受到面临财政压力的地方政府的关注,尤其是分税制改革后,企业税收收入成为地方政府取得财政收入最重要的途径。同时,我国税收征管制度存在的巨大弹性调控空间,也为地方政府利用税收竞争或税收攫取手段,从辖区内企业取得税收资源创造了客观条件。本文以地方政府债务这一独特视角为切入点,实证考察地方政府行为对微观企业实际税负的影响。选取2009-2018年沪深A股上市公司作为微观企业样本,匹配新口径下政府融资平台的有息债务数据。研究发现,当地方政府面临较大的债务压力时,倾向于向辖区内企业伸出“掠夺之手”,通过征收高额税费,甚至直接向企业“摊派”税费的方式攫取税收资源,加重了企业实际税收负担,研究结果在进行稳健性检验后依然可靠。为进一步研究地方政府债务对企业实际税负的影响机制,本文从区域差异、产权性质、税种种类和债务类型四个维度进行了异质性分析。研究表明,中西部地区地方政府债务对企业实际税负的影响大于东部地区;地方政府债务规模的扩张加重了非国有企业的实际税负;地方债压力对企业所得税负的增加作用更为明显;地方融资平台非标准化债务对企业实际税负的正向影响更为强烈。除此之外,本文还从税收征管角度进行了机制分析,运用中介效应模型,揭示了地方政府试图通过加强税收征管等方式从辖区内微观企业“掠夺”财政收入。本文从微观视角明晰了地方政府债务扩张所带来的经济后果,并从企业税负增长层面提供了新的经验证据。实证结果为研究地方政府财政政策的微观效应奠定了理论基础,并为企业税负影响因素的研究提供了新的视角,对地方政府科学管控债务规模、深化税收征管体制改革和激发企业经济活力等具有启示作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,the scale of local government debt in China has accelerated,and the increasingly significant debt problem of local governments has become the key to the overall debt problem.On the one hand,moderate local government debt can make up for the lack of local government financial resources and play an important role in improving infrastructure construction,optimizing resource allocation and promoting economic development;On the other hand,excessive local government debt may not only induce macro-level fiscal and financial risks,but also have far-reaching effects on the behavior of micro enterprises.Local governments have a single source of debt repayment,relying mainly on land concessions and tax revenues.With land being strictly managed by the government,taxation plays an important role in local governments’ ability to relieve debt pressure and leverage ministries.As an important force for regional economic and social development,micro enterprises are to a certain extent concerned by local governments facing debt pressure,especially after the tax sharing reform,enterprise tax revenue has become the most important way for local governments to obtain fiscal revenue.At the same time,the huge space of flexible regulation in China’s tax collection and management system also creates objective conditions for local governments to use tax competition or tax seizure to obtain tax resources from enterprises within their jurisdictions.This paper takes local government debt as an entry point to empirically study the impact of local government behavior on the real tax burden of micro enterprises.A-share listed companies from 2009-2018 are used as the micro sample,matching the interest-bearing debt data of government financing platforms under the new caliber.The findings suggest that local governments attempt to obtain fiscal revenue and achieve debt pressure shifting by increasing the tax burden of enterprises in their jurisdictions,and the findings remain reliable after robustness tests.To further investigate the micro-influence mechanism of local government debt on the actual tax burden of enterprises,this paper conducts a heterogeneity analysis in four dimensions: regional differences,nature of property rights,types of taxes,and types of debt.The study shows that the impact of local government debt on the actual tax burden of enterprises in central and western regions is greater than that in eastern regions;the expansion of local government debt scale aggravates the actual tax burden of non-state enterprises;the pressure of local debt has a more obvious effect on the increase of enterprise income tax burden;the positive impact of non-standardized debt of local financing platform on the actual tax burden of enterprises is stronger.In addition,this paper analyzes the mechanism from the perspective of tax collection and administration,and uses the mediating effect model to reveal that local governments try to "steal" fiscal revenue from micro enterprises in their jurisdictions by strengthening tax collection and administration.The paper clarifies the economic consequences of local government debt expansion from a micro perspective and provides new empirical evidence on the growth of corporate tax burden.The empirical results lay a theoretical foundation for studying the micro effects of macro fiscal policies and provide a new perspective on the factors influencing corporate tax burden,with implications for local governments to scientifically control the scale of debt,deepen the reform of tax collection and management system,and stimulate the economic vitality of enterprises.更多还原