【作者】 周芳；

【导师】 李娟；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 工业工程（专业学位）， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 消费者不具有专业的质检设备,无法准确判断产品合格状况,消费者认知自己对产品合格状况存在模糊区域,因而购买时设定其关于质量的信念水平,将影响零售商质量检测水平与制造商的产品合格率。消费者判断后仍购买到不合格产品,为避免产品不合格危害人体健康,零售商启动召回机制。若供应链中未采用溯源机制,零售商无法判断问题产品来自哪一家制造商,因而召回市场中全部产品;若供应链中采用溯源机制,可快速定位问题制造商,召回该制造商的所有产品,另一家制造商的产品正常销售。针对这一现象,已有文献大多基于质量为消费者带来的效用刻画消费者是否购买的行为,未能刻画出消费者购买不合格产品以及拒绝合格产品的行为。少有文献考虑溯源机制与质量检测相结合情境下对供应链成员决策的影响。因而本文通过信号检测理论刻画消费者行为,研究在有无溯源机制两种情境下,消费者辨别力如何影响制造商的产品合格率和零售商的质量检测水平。本文研究发现,首先,不论有无溯源机制,制造商在收益的降低程度与其责任成本损失降低的程度之间权衡。前者是因为通过零售商质量检测的概率降低,从而获得的收益降低。若制造商收益的降低程度小于其责任成本损失降低的程度,这促使其降低产品合格率;制造商收益的降低程度大于其责任成本损失降低的程度,这促使其提高产品合格率。此外,零售商根据责任成本确定质量检测水平。当零售商承担的责任成本较小时,其因消费者对不合格产品误判产生的损失小于因消费者正确否定产生的损失,随消费者质量信念水平增加,提高其质量检测水平;当零售商承担的责任成本较大时,其因消费者对不合格产品误判产生的损失大于因消费者正确否定产生的损失。此时,若制造商供应的产品比例较高时,降低其质量检测水平以提高市场中产品合格率;若制造商供应的产品比例较低时,提高质量检测水平以提高市场中产品合格率。其次,供应链中采用溯源机制后,制造商由于面临的责任成本仅受自身产品合格率的影响,因而提高其产品合格率,使得零售商的质量检测水平降低。市场的产品合格率和零售商利润均有所提高,制造商的利润仅在该制造商供应产品比例较小时未有所提高,这是由于供应较少的制造商在供应链不采用溯源机制时存在搭便车的行为。特别地,当零售商承担的责任成本较高时,市场的产品合格率和零售商及制造商的利润增长率均较小,在供应链中使用溯源机制的必要性不强。最后,本文分析供应链成员不同的决策顺序对供应链成员决策和利润的影响。发现制造商与零售商同时决策的情形下,虽然市场的产品合格率增加,但制造商与零售商的利润均降低,因而供应链成员并不愿意选择同时决策的顺序。在零售商先决策的情形下,零售商(制造商)的利润在其制造商的供应比例不均衡且承担责任成本较低(供应比例较高且承担责任成本的比例较低)时提高,这表明该供应链中的成员均更愿意先决策,以便获得先动优势。此外,在制造商供应的产品比例较高且承担责任成本较高时,出现消费者、制造商和零售商三赢的状态。更多还原

【Abstract】 Consumers do not have professional quality inspection equipment,unable to accurately judge the product qualification status,consumers know that there is a fuzzy area of product qualification status,so the purchase of their belief level on quality will affect the quality detection level of retailers and the manufacturer’s product qualification rate.Consumers still buy the unqualified products after judgment.In order to prevent the unqualified products from endangering human health,the retailer initiates the recall mechanism.If there is no traceability mechanism in the supply chain,the retailer cannot determine which manufacturer the defective products come from,so it will recall all the products in the market.If traceability is used in the supply chain,the manufacturer in question can be located quickly,all products from that manufacturer can be recalled,and products from another manufacturer can be sold normally.In view of this phenomenon,it is found in the literature that the existing articles depict consumers’ purchasing behavior mostly based on the utility brought by the quality to judge whether to buy or not,and fail to depict consumers’ behaviors of purchasing unqualified products and rejecting unqualified products.The influence of the combination of traceability technology and inspection mechanism on the decision-making of supply chain members is less considered.Therefore,this paper describes consumer behavior and its discrimination through signal detection theory,and studies how consumer discrimination affects the manufacturer’s product qualification rate and the retailer’s quality detection level under the two cases of traceability mechanism.It is found that,regardless of traceability mechanism,for manufacturers,the degree of profit reduction through quality testing and the degree of loss reduction due to liability cost is tradeoffs.If the degree of profit reduction is less than the degree of loss reduction due to liability cost,it will promote the manufacturer to reduce the product pass rate.The reduction of the manufacturer’s profit is greater than the reduction of its liability cost loss,which prompts the manufacturer to improve the product acceptance rate.For retailers,when the responsibility cost borne by retailers is small,the loss caused by consumers’ misjudgment is less than the loss caused by consumers’ correct negation of unqualified products.With the increase of consumers’ quality belief level,the quality detection level should be improved.When the responsibility cost borne by the retailer is large,the loss caused by consumers’ misjudgment is greater than the loss caused by consumers’ correct negation of unqualified products.If the proportion of products supplied by the manufacturer is high,the quality inspection level should be lowered to improve the qualified rate of products in the market.If the proportion of products supplied by the manufacturer is low,improve the quality inspection level to improve the qualified rate of products in the market.After the traceability mechanism is adopted in the supply chain,the manufacturer’s liability cost is only affected by the pass rate of its own products,so it improves the pass rate of its products and reduces the quality detection level of retailers.In the market,both the qualified rate of products and the profit of retailers have been improved,while the profit of manufacturers has not been improved only when the proportion of products supplied by the supplier is small.This is because the suppliers with less supply can free ride when there is no traceability.At the same time,it can be found that when the responsibility cost borne by the retailer is high,the product qualification rate in the market and the profit growth rate of the retailer and the manufacturer are small,and the necessity of using traceability in the supply chain is not strong.The influence of different decision order of supply chain members on decision and profit of supply chain members is analyzed.Compared with the benchmark model,when the manufacturer and retailer make decisions at the same time,although the qualified rate of products in the market increases,the profit of both manufacturer and retailer decreases,so the supply chain members are not willing to choose this decision sequence.In the case of the retailer making the decision first,the profit of the retailer is basically increased,while the profit of the manufacturer is basically decreased,which indicates that the members of the supply chain in the system are more willing to make the decision first and get the first-mover advantage.更多还原