【作者】 王丹；

【导师】 周兰；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2020， 硕士

【摘要】 随着监管机构持续更新监管理念,明确监管目标,创新监管方式。上海证券交易所与深圳证券交易所分别于2013年和2014年正式全面启动信息披露直通车,一线监管模式继而由“事前审核”转变为“事后监管”,年报问询函制度日渐成为证券交易所进行事后监管的主要手段。各大财经媒体纷纷报道年报问询函的系列相关新闻,学术界也愈来愈关注这一监管制度对上市公司产生的实际效应。高管超额在职消费现象在我国由来已久并且根深蒂固,是企业代理成本的一种重要体现。问询函作为一种外部监管措施,能否在一定程度上发挥公司治理作用,缓解超额在职消费问题有待验证。因此,本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、“法与金融”理论、公共利益理论与经济监管论,以我国2014-2017年收到年报问询函的沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,从超额在职消费的视角分析检验了问询函监管对上市公司产生的治理效应。研究表明,问询函监管显著缓解了公司超额在职消费问题,且针对同一年报问询次数越多,超额在职消费降低幅度越大。区分公司特征后发现,对于高管权力较强及信息环境较差的企业,上述治理效果更为显著。进一步地研究发现,年报问询函监管通过抑制超额在职消费问题,有效地提升了公司业绩与价值。本文的贡献主要体现在以下三个方面:首先,本文拓展了年报问询函监管的经济后果研究,从而丰富了年报问询函监管的相关文献;其次,我们探讨了问询函监管对于不同特征企业的监管效果差异,有助于证券交易所明确重点监管企业,加大监管力度,充分发挥问询函的监管作用;最后,文章结论也为新兴市场国家如何加强证券市场监管提供了重要的经验证据和实践参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 As regulators continue to update their supervisory concepts,adjust their supervisory thinking,and innovate supervisory methods.The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange started full reform of information disclosure through trains in 2013 and 2014,respectively,and the front-line supervision model was changed from "pre-examination" to "ex-post supervision".The main means of supervision after the event.Financial media have reported a series of related news in the annual report inquiry letter,and academia is also increasingly concerned about the actual effect of this regulatory system on listed companies.The phenomenon of excessive on-the-job consumption has a long history in my country and is deeply entrenched,which is an important manifestation of the agency cost of enterprises.The inquiry letter,as an external regulatory measure,could play the role in corporate governance to the certain extent and alleviate the issue of executives’ consumption.Therefore,According to the agent theory,"law and finance" theory,information asymmetry theory,public interest theory and economic supervision theory,this paper takes the listed companies that received the annual report inquiry letter in 2014-2017 as the sample,From the perspective of executives’ excessive on-the-job consumption,analyzed and examined the governance effect of comment letter supervision on listed companies.Studies have shown that the supervision of inquiry letters has significantly alleviated the problem of consumption of company executives,and the more inquiries directed to the same annual report,the greater the reduction in excess on-the-job consumption.After distinguishing the characteristics of the company,it is found that for companies with strong executive power and poor information environment,the above-mentioned governance effects are more significant.Further research found that the supervision of the annual report comment letter has effectively improved the company’s performance and value by suppressing the problem of excessive on-the-job consumption.The contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects: First,this paper expands the research on economic consequences of the supervision of the comment letter of the annual report,thereby enriching the relevant literature on the supervision of the inquiry letter of the annual report;second,we explore the different characteristics of the supervision of the comment letter.The differences in the regulatory effects of enterprises will help the stock exchanges to clarify the key regulatory enterprises,increase supervision,and give full play to regulatory role of the comment letter;finally,the conclusion of the article also provides important experience for emerging market countries to strengthen the supervision of the securities market Evidence and practical references..更多还原