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基于多级均衡的企业碳减排决策研究

Research on Enterprise Carbon Emission Reduction Decision Based on Multi-level Equilibrium

【作者】 丁露露

【导师】 张济建;

【作者基本信息】 江苏大学 , 工商管理, 2020, 硕士

【摘要】 碳减排的外部性特征不可避免地导致企业减排的积极性与主动性不会“自动”提升,因此,推进企业减排、落实减排目标责任的过程,实质上是政策推动、激励与约束的过程,也是政府、减排企业与相关利益主体的复杂博弈过程。基于此,本文从企业碳减排的一般发展规律出发,阐述了企业碳减排从初级阶段,到中级阶段并最终发展至高级阶段的发展规律及演变过程。在此基础上,分析了企业碳减排不同发展阶段的具体特征及各相关主体理性水平的发展变化过程,揭示了所处于碳减排不同阶段各方主体的行为动机及利益诉求。进一步,以企业碳减排发展阶段为线索,针对企业碳减排不同阶段特点,构建了相应的博弈模型,据此分析企业碳减排不同阶段的博弈性质及均衡条件,结合实际提出相关对策建议,可为企业碳减排决策和政府部门制定引导策略提供参考。在碳减排发展的初级阶段,博弈主体主要是政企双方,博弈性质属于完全信息静态博弈,政府可能运用的手段是,增加对企业消极减排的惩罚促进企业减排。当碳减排发展至中级阶段,此阶段的博弈主体仍是政企双方,博弈性质属于委托-代理,政府可运用的手段是,增加对企业积极减排的激励促进企业减排。政府提高企业的碳减排收益虽能有效促进企业减排,但“输血式”补贴并非长久之计,唯有通过提高企业的减排技术才能为企业带来源源不断的减排活力。因此,当碳减排发展至高级阶段,政府与企业一致认同研发低碳技术的重要性,但受制于自身技术瓶颈,需要引入第三方-学研机构为减排提供减排技术,此时的博弈主体是企业、地方政府与学研机构,博弈性质属于三方演化博弈,政府可运用的手段是,同时增加对企业积极减排及学研机构研发低碳技术的激励促进减排。在碳减排的初级阶段,企业优先追求自身经济效益目标,当政府对企业消极减排的惩罚力度大于企业消极减排可获得的收益时,企业则会选择积极减排;在碳减排的中级阶段,企业可以根据代理合同调节自身的减排努力水平实现收益最大化;在碳减排的高级阶段,若企业积极减排的期望收益大于零,则企业群里倾向于选择积极减排。但碳减排是涉及多方主体、多阶段的复杂过程,因此,为顺利推进碳减排,既需要企业自身做出正确的减排决策,也离不开政府的引导与激励,同时也需要相关利益主体的协调与配合。

【Abstract】 The externality of carbon emission reduction prevents the enthusiasm and initiative of enterprises from upgrading automatically.Therefore,the process of promoting enterprise emission reduction and implementing emission reduction target responsibilities is essential for policy promotion,incentives and constraints.The process is also a complex game process between the government,emission reduction companies and relevant stakeholders.Accordingly,this article starts from the general development law of enterprise carbon emission reduction,and expounds the development law and evolution process of enterprise carbon emission reduction from the initial stage,to the intermediate stage and finally to the advanced stage.On this basis,the enterprise is analyzed the specific characteristics of carbon emission reduction in different development stages and the development process of the rational level of each relevant subject reveal the behavioral motivation and interest demands of the parties in different stages of carbon emission reduction.Further,taking the development stage of corporate carbon emission reduction as a clue,according to the characteristics of different stages of corporate carbon emission reduction,a corresponding game model is constructed based on which the game nature and equilibrium conditions of different stages of corporate carbon emission reduction are analyzed,and relevant correlations are put forward in light of the actual.The countermeasures and suggestions can provide references for enterprises to make carbon emission reduction decisions and guide strategies formulated by government departments.In the initial stage of the development of carbon emission reduction,the players involved in the game are mainly government and enterprises.The nature of the game is a complete information static game.The government may use means to increase the penalty for negative emission reduction of enterprises to promote enterprise emission reduction.When carbon emission reduction develops to the intermediate stage,the players involved in this stage of the game are still government and enterprises.The nature of the game is principal-agent.The means that the government can use is to increase incentives for companies to actively reduce emissions and promote enterprise emissions reduction.Although the government’s increase in carbon emission reduction income can effectively promote enterprise emission reduction,the "blood transfusion" subsidy is not a long-term plan.Only by improving the enterprise’s emission reduction technology can it bring continuous emission reduction vitality to the enterprise.Therefore,when carbon emission reduction has advanced to an advanced stage,the government and enterprises agree on the importance of developing low-carbon technologies,but subject to their own technical bottlenecks,it is necessary to introduce third-party academic institutions to provide emission reduction technologies for emission reduction.The main players are enterprises,local governments and academic institutions,and the nature of the game is a tripartite evolutionary game.The means available to the government are,at the same time,to increase incentives for companies to actively reduce emissions and to develop low-carbon technologies for academic institutions to promote emission reduction.In the initial stage of carbon emission reduction,enterprises give priority to pursuing their own economic benefits.When the government ’s punishment for passive emission reduction of enterprises is greater than the benefits available for passive emission reduction,enterprises will choose to actively reduce emissions.In the intermediate stage,companies can adjust their own emission reduction efforts to maximize returns based on agency contracts.In the advanced stage of carbon emission reduction,if the expected return from active emission reduction is greater than zero,the enterprise group tends to choose active emission reduction.However,carbon emission reduction is a complex process involving multiple parties and multiple stages.Therefore,in order to successfully promote carbon emission reduction,not only the enterprise itself needs to make correct emission reduction decisions,but also requires the guidance and incentives of the government,as well as relevant stakeholders coordination and cooperation.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 江苏大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2021年 05期
  • 【分类号】F270;F224.32;X322
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】123
  • 攻读期成果
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