【作者】 陈林；

【导师】 黄新建；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 工商管理， 2019， 硕士

【摘要】 股权质押是指出质人以其所拥有的股权作为质押标的物而获得资金的一种方式。对控股股东而言,股权质押的出现,一方面为其提供了一种新的融资方式,缓解了融资约束所导致的财务困境;另一方面,也加大了控股股东的风险。一旦股票的价格严重下跌,控股股东可能会陷入财务困境或者发生控制权转移,这是大部分控股股东不愿看到的。相比于其他的质押担保,股权质押的质押物是股份,股票的价格与股东的风险息息相关,价格越稳定,越能防范财务困境和控制权转移的风险,因此控股股东会产生稳定甚至是抬高股票价格的动机。股票的价格反映的是外界的投资者对公司未来经营业绩的一种预期,这种预期和公司盈余信息有着显著相关性,所以控股股东会通过操纵盈余管理达到稳定股价的目的,防止风险的发生。盈余管理往往会给上市公司的各利益相关者带来较多的不良后果,故学者们一直在讨论如何对其进行有效的治理。目前,盈余管理治理一般包括两个方面,内部治理和外部治理。已经有较多的学者发现,审计可以作为一种外部治理方式对盈余管理产生影响,比如审计师的行业特长,审计投入等因素。目前国内外已经有较多的学者在研究审计师特征、股权质押和盈余管理,但是大部分都仅着眼于其中两方面的相互关系,仅考虑了股权质押和盈余管理,或者是盈余管理和审计师特征之间的相互作用;目前还没有文献研究它们三者之间的关系,但是在控股股东股权质押行为如此盛行的情况下,如何尽可能的规范公司的行为,抑制盈余管理,防止股权质押行为给债权人、中小股东和外部投资者所带来的危害,是当前必须要考虑的问题,对保护各相关者的利益有着很大的现实价值。本文在现有研究成果的基础上,梳理了控股股东股权质押行为和盈余管理之间的关系,加入了审计师个人经验、审计师校友关系这两个审计师特征,分别探析其对股权质押和盈余管理之间某种关系的调节作用。结合我国目前的实际情况,界定本文研究的核心概念,介绍了相关的理论基础,并提出了本文实证分析的研究假设。文章使用2011-2017年深圳交易所上市A股公司的数据,通过构建控股股东股权质押和盈余管理、审计师特征和盈余管理,以及审计师特征对其二者之间调节作用的回归模型,深入分析了审计师层面的特征对控股股东股权质押和盈余管理关系的调节作用。经过研究发现:(1)控股股东股权质押行为的发生,与应计盈余管理呈显著负相关,和真实盈余管理呈显著正相关。(2)审计师的个人经验和校友关系,均会降低应计盈余管理,而增强真实盈余管理。(3)加入了交互项衡量调节作用后,发现审计师的个人经验和校友关系都对股权质押和盈余管理(包括应计盈余管理以及真实盈余管理)的关系起正向调节作用。说明了审计师的个人经验和校友关系,提高了审计质量,加大了控股股东面临的外部监管压力,改变了股权质押后股东对盈余管理的预期,增强了应计盈余管理以及真实盈余管理之间的“替代性”。本文将控股股东股权质押这一特定行为的发生作为研究的出发点,讨论了股权质押、审计师特征对盈余管理的影响,丰富了盈余管理和股权质押的相关研究。为中小股东、外部投资者以及债权人进行有关决策提供一定的参考,也为监管机构制定有关政策提供了理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 The pledge of stock rights is a way to get funds by taking the equity which pledgees own as the subject matter of the pledged.For controlling shareholders,on the one hand,the emergence of equity pledge provides a new financing way for them,alleviating the financial difficulties caused by financing constraints;on the other hand,it increases the risk of controlling shareholders.Once the stock price falls seriously,the controlling shareholders may fall into financial difficulties or transfer control rights,which is most of the controlling shareholders do not want to see.Compared with other guarantees,the pledge of equity is stock.The more stable the price of stock is,the more able to guard against financial distress and the risk of control transfer.Therefore,controlling shareholders will have the motivation of stabilizing or even raising the stock price.The stock price reflects the expectation of the external investors for the future performance of the company.This expectation is related to earnings information.Therefore,controlling shareholders will have strong motivation to manage earnings in order to stabilize the price of stocks and to prevent the occurrence of risks.Earnings management often brings adverse consequences to the stakeholders of listed companies,so scholars have been discussing how to effectively govern the earning management.Now earnings management governance generally includes two aspects,internal governance and external governance.Many scholars have found that auditing can affect earnings management as an external governance mode,such as auditor’s industry expertise,audit input,the size of accounting firms,auditor’s personal experience and other factors.At present,many scholars at home and abroad have studied the auditor’s characteristics,equity pledge and earnings management,but most of them only focus on the relationship between two aspects,only considering the relationship between equity pledge and earnings management,or the interaction between earnings management and auditor’s characteristics;at present,no one has studied the relationship among them.But under such a prevalent situation,how to regulate the company’s behavior as far as possible,restrain earnings management,and prevent the damage of equity pledge to creditors,small and medium shareholders and external investors is a problem that must be considered at present,which has great practical value for protecting the interests of all stakeholders.On the basis of the existing research results,this paper first combs the relationship between the equity pledge’ behavior of controlling shareholders and earnings management,adds the auditor’s personal experience and auditor alumni relationship as two auditor characteristics,and respectively explores their regulatory role in the relationship between equity pledge and earnings management.Secondly,according to the actual situation of our country,this paper defines the core concepts of this study,introduces the relevant theoretical basis,and puts forward the research hypothesis of empirical analysis in this paper.Based on the data of A-share companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2017,this paper constructs a regression model of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,earnings management,auditor characteristics,and the role of auditor characteristics in regulating the relationship between them,and deeply analyses the role of auditor-level characteristics in regulating the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and earnings management.It found that the occurrence of equity pledge by controlling shareholders is negatively correlated with the accrued earnings management,and positively correlated with the real earnings management.Auditor’s personal experience and alumni relationship will reduce accrued earnings management and enhance real earnings management.After adding the measure and adjustment function of the interaction item,it found that the auditor’s personal experience and alumni relationship have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between equity pledge and earnings management(including accrued earnings management and real earnings management).It illustrates the auditor’s personal experience and alumni relationship could improve the audit quality,increase the external supervision pressure faced by controlling shareholders,change shareholders’ expectations of earnings management after equity pledge,and enhance the "substitution" between accrued earnings management and real earnings management.This paper regards the occurrence of the specific behavior of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge as the starting point of the study,and discusses the impact of equity pledge and auditor’s characteristics on earnings management,which enriches the relevant research on earnings management and equity pledge.It provides some reference for small and medium-sized shareholders,external investors and creditors to make relevant decisions,and provides a theoretical basis for regulators to formulate relevant policies.更多还原