【作者】 王羽；

【导师】 谭荣；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2018， 硕士

【摘要】 随着城市化进程加速和城市建设用地短缺对宏观经济发展的制约,在严守耕地红线和城乡统筹发展的要求下,农村土地制度改革和构建城乡统一建设用地市场逐渐被提上日程。十八届三中全会以来,中央提出战略性土地改革方针,其中一项是试点开展集体经营性建设用地入市改革。在入市过程中,北京大兴、广东南海等地探索了镇域或区域统筹的模式,在整合土地资源、土地规模利用、产业转型升级等方面产生了积极的作用。基于集体经营性建设用地入市实践中出现的不同的统筹模式,本文旨在解释为何不同地区采取了(或需要采取)不同的统筹模式,即辨别入市统筹模式选择的影响因素,以及如何评估或比较不同的统筹模式下入市改革的成效。本文从实现“同地同权同价”、增值收益共享、治理效率提升等方面梳理了入市改革的内涵,基于IoS框架和Williamson的交易费用经济学范式构建理论框架、提出理论假设并结合案例分析进行验证。理论分析表明,交易属性与行动主体的特征会对治理结构的选择产生影响,而不同的治理结构又会导致治理绩效的差异。案例研究显示,人力资本专用性、交易行为不确定性和交易复杂性越高时,统筹入市中越倾向于采用政府主导的混合型治理结构;物质资本专用性、交易环境不确定性越低时,统筹入市中越倾向于采用农民集体主导的混合型治理结构。一般而言,入市统筹中行动主体的数量或规模越小、利益趋同性越强、民主决策参与程度越高、拥有的社会资本越丰富,越倾向于采取农民集体主导的混合型治理结构。大兴区西红门镇在入市过程中,各村集体以地入股成立了镇属土地资产联营公司作为入市统筹主体,对应农民集体主导的混合型治理结构;南海区桂城街道则通过成立区级和街道集体土地整备中心作为入市统筹主体,对应政府主导的混合型治理结构,均符合根据交易费用和行动主体特征的匹配治理结构的理论假设,但是这一匹配并不一定能保证最优,从资源利用、收益分配、治理效率和外部影响等方面对治理绩效的评价能进一步检验匹配结果。从目前试点情况来看,入市统筹更适宜采用农民集体主导、政府引导、市场参与的混合型治理结构,这也是大兴区“镇级统筹”模式对应的治理结构。经过理论分析和案例研究,本文最后从交易属性调整、治理结构改进和治理绩效提升三个方面提出相应的政策建议,并对本文可能的创新点及研究存在的不足进行总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 Along with the rapid urbanization and constrain on economic growth because of lack of urban construction land,as well as the requirement of adhering to the cultivated land red line and balancing rural and urban development,the reform of rural land institutions and establishment of a unified construction land market in rural and urban areas has finally been taken into consideration.Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC,the CPC Central Committee has put forward the strategic policy of land reform among which is to give admission to collective-owned construction land for entering the land market in the pilot areas.During the reform period,some pilot areas carried out the whole land reform in a coordinated way on the scale of the whole town or the area such as Daxing District in Beijing and Nanhai District in Guangdong Province,which seem to have a positive effect on integrating land resources,realizing land use scale effect and upgrading the local industry.Based on the discovery of the fact that different patterns of organizing this rural land reform in a coordinate way has emerged,this paper aim to reveal why different areas choose(or why they have to choose)different coordination patterns which is to explain what are the important factors that must be taken into account when deciding what patterns to choose,and then this paper will try to evaluate or compare the performances under different hybrid modes.Under the intention of through this collective mercantile construction land reform to realize similar rights and price of rural and urban construction land,give rural people the opportunity to share value-added land revenue and improve governance efficiency,this paper has put forward the theoretical hypothesis based on the Institutions of Sustainability(loS)framework and the Williamson Transaction Cost Economics(TCE)paradigm and then use the pilot case in typical areas for verificationTheoretical analysis shows that transaction attributes and characteristics of actors will influence the choice of governance structures and thus lead to different performances.Case study reveals that the higher the specificity of human capital,the uncertainty of transaction behavior and the complexity of transactions,the more government-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.The lower the specificity of material capital and the uncertainty of the transaction environment,the more collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.In general,the smaller the number or size of actors in the market integration,the stronger the convergence of interests,the higher the degree of participation in democratic decision-making and the richer the social capital they possess,the more collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.In terms of Xihongmen Town in Daxing District,villages collectively acquired shares of the land ownership as a land-asset joint venture company as the main entity for implementation of this reform,which fits the collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure.In terms of Guicheng street in Nanhai District,the main implementing entities for this land reform is the establishment of district-level and street-level collective land consolidation centers,which fits the government-led hybrid governance structure.Case analysis indicates that the governance structure in use are chosen based on the fitness of transaction attributes and characteristics of actors which fits the theoretical assumptions,but this fitness does not always mean the best and the performances under different hybrid modes can be compared from the perspective of resource use,income distribution,governance efficiency and external effects,which can be seen as a double check of governance fit.Judging from the current pilot conditions,it is more appropriate to adopt a hybrid governance structure led by collective organizations with government guidance and market participation,which is also the corresponding governance structure of in Daxing District where the street-level collective-owned construction land marketization is carried out.Based on theoretical analysis and case study,this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from three aspects including adjustment of transaction attributes,choice of governance structure and improvement of governance performance.Finally,this paper also concludes the possible innovations and deficiencies need further study.更多还原