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两阶段竞争下提前期—价格响应模式均衡策略研究

Lead Time and Price Equilibrium Decisions under Two-stage Competition

【作者】 魏超

【导师】 李怡娜;

【作者基本信息】 华南理工大学 , 管理科学与工程, 2017, 硕士

【摘要】 在两阶段竞争的市场上,本文研究了当顾客对不同的提前期-价格响应模式有不同的选择行为时,双寡头企业在不同竞争环境下的最优提前期-价格决策及均衡决策。在利用效用函数刻画其顾客购买选择行为的基础上,结合企业自身的能力和成本特性,建立三种不同竞争情景下双寡头企业提前期-价格竞争模型,分别分析提前期-价格决策及其均衡策略。首先,通过建立第一阶段双寡头企业的提前期-价格竞争模型,分析不同竞争情景下双寡头企业的最优提前期-价格决策。研究结果表明,在提前期-价格竞争市场上,双寡头企业的提前期-价格策略会受到由顾客的感知价值、偏好程度和企业自身成本特性所决定的边际盈利能力的影响。采用边际盈利能力较大的响应模式的企业可以索取更高的价格,提供更短的提前期服务,具有较大的市场份额。其次,通过对比第一阶段竞争中不同竞争情景下双寡头企业的利润,得出最优响应模式决策及均衡策略。研究结果表明,当慢速响应模式的边际盈利能力较大时,双寡头企业会处于同时采取慢速响应模式的均衡;当快速响应模式的边际盈利能力较大时,如果顾客忠诚程度较高,双寡头企业会处于同时采取快速响应模式的均衡,否则会形成两个企业同时采取快速响应模式、同时采取慢速响应模式以及混合响应模式的三种均衡策略。最后,在考虑异质顾客的基础上构建第二阶段不同竞争情景下双寡头企业的提前期-价格竞争模型,对比分析两阶段的提前期、价格及其利润,并用数值分析得出基于路径演化的最优响应模式及其均衡策略,并考虑顾客留存率对策略的影响。研究结果表明,第二阶段的提前期-价格策略会受到顾客留存率以及第一阶段市场份额的影响,并与两阶段竞争演化路径有关。数值分析揭示了第二阶段双寡头企业的均衡策略会受到两个因素的影响:顾客留存率和响应模式的边际盈利能力。当顾客留存率较小时,均衡策略主要受边际盈利能力的影响,结果和一阶段竞争相同;否则均衡策略受边际盈利能力的影响减小。

【Abstract】 On two-stage competition market,this paper investigates duopoly enterprises’ optimal lead time and price decision on different competitive environment when customers have different choice behavior on different lead time and price response model.On the basis of using the utility function to describe customers buying choice behavior and combining with the enterprise’s own ability and cost characteristic,we set up duopoly enterprises lead time and price competition model on three different competitive scenarios,respectively to analyze lead time decision and their equilibrium strategies.First of all,analyzing the duopoly enterprises’ optimal lead time and price decision under different competitive situations through establishing the first stage lead time and price competition model of duopoly enterprises.We find the equilibrium outcome depends on the marginal profitability index,which signifies the customer’s perceived value and relative attractiveness of different quotation strategies,as well as the enterprise’s cost characteristic,and the customer’s loyalty to the brand reputation.Enterprises using the larger marginal profitability response model can ask for a higher price,provide a shorter lead time service and have a larger market share.Secondly,we conclude the optimal response mode decision and the equilibrium strategies by comparing the first phase duopoly enterprises profits under different competitive scenarios.As the marginal profitability index of slow quotation strategy is relative large,there exists an equilibrium where both duopoly enterprises adopt slow quotation strategies.While as the marginal profitability index of fast quotation strategy is relative large,if the customer’s loyalty to the brand reputation is high,there exists an equilibrium where both duopoly enterprises adopt fast quotation strategies.Otherwise,there exist three equilibrium decisions,namely,both fast,both slow and hybrid quotation strategies.Finally,developing the second stage duopoly enterprises’ lead time and price competition model based on considering the heterogeneous customer under different competitive scenarios,and analyzing two-stage lead time,price and profit,and using numerical analysis to get the optimal response decision based on the evolution path,and consider the influence of the customer retention rate on strategy.We find that the second-stage lead time and price strategy will be affected by three factors: the customer retention rate,the first stage’ market share the evolution path.Numerical analysis reveals the two-stage equilibrium strategies depends on two factors: customer retention rates and marginal profitability index.When customer retention rates is low,the equilibrium outcome is same as the first-stage.Otherwise,the marginal profitability is weakened.

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