【作者】 丁鹏；

【导师】 李宏勋；

【作者基本信息】 中国石油大学(华东) ， 工商管理， 2015， 硕士

【摘要】 通过建立博弈模型,将油气价格改革和管道独立改革的核心要素(油气价格和管道资产)纳入模型分析框架,从理论上分析了我国油气行业两大改革对管道共建共享的影响,对合理制定改革方案,保障改革措施的顺利推进具有重要意义。首先从企业利润最大化角度分析了我国当前油气管道重复建设的原因,建立了包含管道资产存量和管道共建共享程度的Spokes模型,研究表明,由于管道具有自然垄断性,当企业管道资产存量不对称时,管道优势企业的最优策略为努力降低管道共建共享程度以增强其在下游消费市场的垄断力,即不参与管道共建共享;管道劣势企业的最优策略有两个,其一是加强管道建设,缩小与管道优势企业的差距,其二是成为管道优势企业的上游油气供应商。而当管道资产存量对称时,油气企业的利润将不受管道共建共享程度的影响。这为管道独立改革提供了理论支持,即通过将管道资产或者管道管理权收归国有,建立独立于油气企业的管道公司运营全部管道的方式,能够实现三大油气企业管道资产的相对均衡,进而解决管道重复建设问题。在此基础上,预测了油气价格改革完成后影响企业管道共建共享决策的主要因素的作用方式,建立了双寡头油气企业两阶段Stackelberg价格博弈模型,研究表明,在油气价格市场化条件下,油气企业管道共建共享程度与市场容量、管道资产-市场份额系数和管道优势成反比,与管道建设成本和管道合作收益成正比。最后引入政府参与,分析政府通过宏观调控手段引导油气企业实现管道共建共享的可行性。沿袭经济学建模思路,将政府宏观调控手段对油气企业的影响(包括各种形式的奖励和惩罚)内化为对企业征收的“所得税”,将其视为一种经济要素,进而建立了政府—油气企业两阶段动态博弈模型,研究表明,政府通过宏观调控手段可以引导企业趋向政府所偏好的管道共建共享程度,其前提是政府的税收目标不能过于强烈,同时需要考虑不同油气企业的管道共建共享成本系数。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to analyze the influence of price reform and pipeline independence reform on the co-construction and sharing of oil and gas pipeline,this paper establishes game models which incorporate the core factors of the two reforms into corresponding models’ analytical framework.The research results will be helpful for designing a proper scheme and obtaining a smooth implementation.First of all,from the perspective of corporate profit maximization,this paper establishes Spokes model composed of the existing pipeline asset and spillover effect to analyze the reasons for repeated construction of oil and gas pipeline.The research shows that pipeline has a strong natural monopoly,therefore,when the pipeline assets are asymmetric among oil and gas enterprises,the optimal strategy of the preponderant enterprise is to keep a low level of pipeline cooperation,which means the preponderant enterprise won’t participate in any kind of pipeline cooperation,with the purpose of maximizing the monopolization force in the downstream market.For the inferior enterprises,there are two optimal strategies.On one hand,they can build more pipeline to bridge the gap with the preponderant enterprise.On the other hand,they quit the downstream market,and turn to the suppliers of the preponderant enterprise.However,if the pipeline assets are symmetric among oil and gas enterprises,the profits of all enterprises are free of the behavior of co-construction and sharing of oil and gas pipeline.The research results provide theoretic support for the independence reform of oil and gas pipeline.If the central government nationalizes the all the pipeline and set up specialized agency to manage all the pipeline,it will realize a balanced distribution of pipeline among oil and gas enterprises.Apparently,there won’t exist repeated construction of oil and gas pipeline.With the help of previous analysis,this paper discusses the mechanism of action of the influence factors of pipeline cooperation with the assumption that the price reform of oil and gas has completed.This paper established a two-stage Stackelberg price competition model with duopoly enterprises.The result shows that if enterprises are able to set their product prices freely,the degree of pipeline cooperation is in inverse proportion to the market capacity,the coefficient of pipeline asset and market share and the pipeline advantage,and in proportion to the construction cost of pipeline and cooperative profit.In the end,this paper introduces the government,and analyzes the feasibility that the government enacts rules and regulations to guide the oil and gas enterprises to construct pipeline jointly or share their pipeline.Following the convention of economics,this paper treats the reward and the punishment derived from the macro-control methods of the government as a certain kind of income tax.And then this paper set up a two-stage dynamic game model with the government and the oil and gas enterprises.The results show that the macro-control methods of the government will guide the enterprises approach the co-construction and sharing level of pipeline favored by the government.However,the government should limit its tax objective and refer to the cost coefficients of pipeline cooperation of different enterprises.更多还原