【作者】 孙聪；

【导师】 梁英；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 会计学， 2017， 硕士

【摘要】 审计关系产生于委托代理关系中委托人与代理人之间的代理问题,审计的本质是对作为代理人的管理人员受托责任进行评价。在正常的审计代理关系中,注册会计师作为独立的第三方,受聘于委托人,其职责是监督代理人的工作,并对此发表审计意见。而实际上,由于公司利益相关者众多且分散,审计报告有了公共物品的属性,使得审计代理关系中实际委托人缺位,管理者同时作为被审计对象和审计费用的承担者,出于自身利益考虑向注册会计师施加压力成为可能,再加上非标意见对上市公司的严重打击,管理人员具有更强烈的动机向审计人员购买审计意见。另一方面,我国审计市场竞争激烈,市场集中度低,因而事务所谈判能力较弱,再加上法律体系尚不健全,事务所面临的法律风险较低,因此,审计人员在执行审计业务时很可能妥协于被审计单位的要求。审计费用是上市公司与会计师事务所之间的桥梁,审计人员对审计质量的妥协必定会在某种程度上体现在审计费用中,从而形成异常审计费用。因此本文从审计费用出发,从中分离出异常部分审计费用,研究其对审计质量的影响。鉴于我国相关法规对审计费用的管制主要突出最低限价导向,并未对市场中普遍存在的审计购买现象进行明确管制,所以本文将异常审计费用分为正向和负向,其中正向表示实际审计费用高于正常值,而负向则表示实际审计费用低于正常值,同时考察了正负向异常审计费用对审计质量的影响。本文首先选取2008-2015年A股上市公司数据,使用比例法得到异常审计费用的估计值,然后通过修正的琼斯模型估计被审计单位的可操控应计作为审计质量的替代变量,最后对二者相关关系进行回归,得出结论:无论是正向还是负向的异常审计费用,都会对审计质量造成负面影响。一方面,过高的审计费用可能说明了审计人员在审计过程中丧失了独立性,接受了被审计单位的审计购买要求;另一方面,过低的审计费用则可能代表了审计市场的低价竞争和事务所为保证收益进行的审计程序缩减。另外,考虑到我国自2007年以来逐步推进会计师事务所改制的大形势,本文就事务所组织形式对异常审计费用和审计质量相关性的调节作用进行检验,由于事务所转制的效果具有非同步性,本文在上述研究样本的基础上剔除2010-2013年的转制过渡期,回归结果表明,特殊合伙制减弱了异常审计费用对审计质量的负面影响,这一结论说明事务所转制在一定程度上提高了审计市场效率,为带动审计执业水平提升提供了新方法。本文共分为六个部分:第一部分主要介绍了研究背景、研究意义、研究方法以及研究创新点;第二部分主要从审计费用影响因素、审计质量替代变量、异常审计费用对审计质量影响以及事务所组织形式相关研究四个方面,对国内外相关文献进行回顾;第三部分从委托代理理论出发对审计费用进行分析,并由此提出假设;第四部分主要是样本的选取、变量解释以及模型的建立;第五部分进行了实证检验并对结果进行分析;第六部分则对前文的研究进行总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 The relationship of audit arises from the agency problem between the principal and the agent in the principal-agent relationship.The essence of audit is to evaluate the performance of the manager.In the normal principal-agent relationship in auditing,the certified public accountant is employed by the principal as an independent third party,whose duty is to supervise the work of the agent and sign the audit opinion.In fact,there are so many scattered stakeholders of the company,the audit report yet has the properties of public goods,and the actual principal in the principal-agent relationship of auditing is hardly exists.Therefore,the manager is the one who was audited,at the same time,also the one who assumed the audit fee.It seems likely that the manager would pressure the accountant for his own interests.What’s more,considering the bad influence of non-standard opinions,the manager has strong motivation to purchase better opinions.In addition,because of the low concentration and intense competition of auditing market,accounting office always has low negotiation ability when negotiating with listed company.What’s more,the legal system in China is still no perfect,which means the legal risk of accounting office is relatively low.Therefore,the accountant is likely to be compromised by the requirements that the listed company suggests.Audit fee connects listed company and accounting office,so that the compromise on audit quality will reflect in audit fee to some extent,especially in abnormal audit fee.This paper divides audit fee into normal fee and abnormal fee and analyses the relationship between abnormal fee and audit quality.China’s relevant laws and regulations on audit fee mainly highlight the minimum price guiding,but not exist on the phenomenon of audit purchase.Therefore,this paper analyses the relationship of abnormal audit fee and audit quality by dividing the abnormal audit fee into positive and negative.Positive abnormal audit fee means that actual audit fee is higher than normal fee,and negative abnormal audit fee means that actual audit fee is lower than normal fee.This paper has an evaluation of abnormal audit fee by using ratio method and discretionary accruals on the basis of the adjusted Jones model with the data of A-share listed company in year 2008-2015,and then tests the relation between abnormal audit fee and audit quality.The result shows that abnormal audit fee,no matter positive of negative,would damage audit quality.On the one hand,the higher abnormal audit fee perhaps means CPA has lost their independence and accepted the company’s purchasing requirement;on the other hand,the lower abnormal audit fee may explain the price competition in audit market and the procedure reducing the office made for ensuring the benefits.This result shows that abnormal audit fee has a function of signal to audit quality,which means,abnormal audit fee can be used as an observable index to judge audit quality to some extent.In addition,considering the reforming of accounting office in China since 2007,this paper examines the moderating effect of firm organization form on the correlation between abnormal audit fee and audit quality.Because of the un-synchronism of the offices’ transformation,this paper drops the samples during year 2010-2013.The result shows that the Limited Liability Partnership weakens the negative effect of abnormal audit fee on audit quality.This conclusion shows that the reforming of audit office,to a certain extent,improves the efficiency of the auditing market,and provides a new method to improve auditing level.This paper is divided into six parts: the first part mainly introduces the research background,the significance of this paper,the innovation point and the methods used in this research.The second part is the review of related literature at home and abroad,such as the research of audit fees determinants,audit quality alternative variables,the relation of abnormal audit fee and audit quality and relative research of organization form of accounting office.The third part is the analysis of the principal-agent theory,and put forward the hypothesis based on the theory.The fourth part contains the sample selection,variable interpretation and the model.The fifth part is the result of the empirical research.The sixth part is the conclusions of this paper.更多还原