【作者】 李超群；

【导师】 吴文清；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 工商管理， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 科技企业孵化器作为连接资本与高科技企业的重要桥梁,培育创业企业和科技企业家的摇篮,推动新兴经济发展的重要力量,关于孵化器的研究越来越受到学者的重视。孵化器管理者是孵化器核心竞争力的主要来源,本文将以孵化器管理者为研究中心,将行为科学理论引入到系统研究中,主要通过三个行为因素对孵化器管理者与创业者、创业投资企业以及政府的合作博弈进行研究。本文首先研究双边过度自信下孵化器管理者和创业者合作的纳什和斯坦克尔伯格均衡模型,以及过度自信对双方努力水平和效用的影响,并比较两种均衡下过度自信和财政政策对双方行为的影响。研究表明,在纳什和斯坦克尔伯格两种均衡以及过度自信下,孵化器管理者和创业者均衡努力水平分别大于理性条件下双方均衡努力水平;双方过度自信程度越大,过度自信下孵化器管理者和创业者的均衡努力水平也越大;孵化器管理者和创业者之间相互作用对创业企业成功率影响越大,理性条件下和过度自信下双方的努力水平都越大;双方过度自信下,斯坦克尔伯格模型下的创业者努力水平较纳什均衡下高。其次研究科技企业孵化器内部升迁激励因素对过度自信下孵化器管理者行为的影响,研究发现过度自信下的孵化器管理者会获得更大的升迁几率。最后研究公平偏好下的孵化器管理者与创投的斯坦克尔伯格博弈过程,经研究发现相比于不考虑公平偏好的情形,仅科技企业孵化器具有公平偏好时,对创投要求的最优分配比例随自身对公平偏好程度的增加而增加;仅考虑创业投资企业有公平偏好时,当其具有的公平偏好程度较小时,创投对孵化器最优分配比例会相应的提高,当创投具有的公平偏好程度较大时,创投对孵化器最优分配比例应相应的降低;创投对孵化器的利润分配率与税收强度或财政返还强度成反比;科技企业孵化器均衡时努力工作的概率与税收强度或财政返还强度成正比。研究发现,将过度自信、升迁激励和公平偏好引入到孵化器管理的研究中,有助于理解管理者实际经济活动中的行为,从而有助于提升孵化器整体的运行效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 Technology business incubators work as an important bridge which link the capital and high-tech companies,also cultivate start-ups and technology entrepreneurs,and an important force to promote the development of emerging economies,which are valued by more and more scholars.Incubator managers are the core source of incubator’s competitiveness,this dissertation focuses on the cooperative game research among incubator managers,entrepreneurs,venture capital companies and governments mainly through three behavioral factors.This dissertation firstly studies the cooperation of a business incubator manager and an entrepreneur under the bilateral overconfidence circumstances that have an influence on the efforts and the effectiveness of the both sides.This dissertation uses Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium to compare the overconfidence and fiscal policies on the impact of differences in behavior of the both sides.Studies have shown that the overconfident business incubator manager and the entrepreneur enjoy a higher level of effort than rational ones in the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium.The greater of the degree of overconfidence is,the higher equilibrium level of effort the business incubator manager and the entrepreneur have.The interaction between managers and entrepreneurs has a positive impact on the success rate of start-ups,the greater impact is,the greater equilibrium level of effort is,no matter rational or overconfident business incubator managers and entrepreneurs are.For overconfident entrepreneurs,the equilibrium efforts of Stackelberg model are higher than Nash model.Secondly,this dissertation studies how the business incubator promotion incentive affects the behavior of incubator managers,studies have shown that overconfidence incubator managers will gain greater opportunity for advancement.Finally the dissertation studies how fairness preference influence incubator managers’ behavior,also use Stackelberg equilibrium model for the incubator managers and venture investment enterprises to analyze the game process,the researchers find that compared to the case which not considers unfair preference,when only technology business incubators have fairness preference,requires an increasing optimal allocation ratio with their own fair degree of preference increases;considering only fair with the preferences,when it has a small fair degree of preference,and venture capital incubator optimal allocation of venture capital companies will be increasing,when with a large degree of preference equity venture,the venture capital incubator optimal allocation ratio would be reducing.The dissertation finds that take overconfidence,promotion and fairness preferences into the research incubator managers will help us understand the behavior of real economic activity,so as to enhance the overall efficiency of the incubator.更多还原