【作者】 朱娜；

【导师】 刘少波；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 金融学， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 有效的经理人激励机制可以使股东与经理人利益趋于一致,从而缓解代理问题,降低代理成本,促进企业价值创造。西方发达国家公司治理的相关理论及实践已经证明,股权激励是一种有效的公司治理机制,因此在西方资本市场上得到广泛推行。我国的股权激励实践伴随着中国资本市场的产生和发展不断探索前行。随着股权分置改革的推行,2005年12月31日证监会颁布了《上市公司股权激励计划管理办法》(试行),不少上市公司积极进行股改,推出了以股票期权、限制性股票与股票增值权为主要激励方式,类似于西方发达资本市场的股权激励计划。内部监管治理作为另一类公司治理机制,由于存在具体的监管执行者和可见的影响路径,可以直接抑制经理人代理行为。内部监管和股权激励作为两种并列的公司治理机制,都是为了缓解代理问题的制度设计。随着高管持股比例的增加,对公司的实际控制力也增强,代理问题进一步加剧,需要更强的内部监管治理对其权力进行约束,也就是说股权激励与内部监管治理需要形成配套设计,以实现协同治理效应。然而是否不同的内部监管治理和股权激励都体现了这种“激励与控制”的协同治理关系?当公司内部监管环境不同时,内部监管治理对股权激励效果的影响是否有所差异?这些就是本文的主要研究的问题。本文选取2006-2014年管理层持股的上市公司作为样本,以机构投资者(境内)治理、大股东治理和外资股东(QFII)治理作为内部监管治理的三个代表治理机制,通过回归分析研究这三个内部监管治理机制对股权激励效果的影响。研究发现机构投资者(境内)持股比例越高,股权激励效果越好。在股权集中度较低的公司样本中,随着股权的集中,大股东治理能力越强,股权激励也表现出更好的激励效果。在股权集中度较高的公司中,大股东治理对股权激励效果并无显著影响。无QFII持股的上市公司股权激励效果显著好于有QFII持股的上市公司。同时,根据以上研究结论提出了相应的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Effective managers incentives can make the interests of shareholders and managers converge, to alleviate the agency problem, reduce agency costs and promote value creation. Theory and practice of corporate governance in western countries has proven equity incentive is an effective corporate governance mechanism, and therefore has been widely implemented in the western capital markets.The equity incentive practices in China explored forward step by step and developed along with our capital market. With the implementation of the split share structure reform, the CSRC promulgated the 《The management approach oflisted company equity incentive program(Trial)》on Dec.31,2005.Lots of listed companies carry out the share reform actively and adopted stock options, restricted stock and stock appreciation rights as the main equity incentives modes, which are similar to the equity incentive plans inwestern developed capital markets,.As another kind of corporate governance mechanism, internal regulatory governance can directly inhibit the manager’s agent behavior due to the presence of specific regulator and visible influencing paths. Internal regulatory governance and equity incentive are two kinds of parallel systematic designs to alleviate agency problems. With the increasing proportion of manager’s ownership, the actual control of the company is also enhanced, which further exacerbate the agency problem. Therefore the company needs to form greater internal regulatory mechanism to constraint the power of managers. That is to say, equity incentive and internal regulatory governance need to be adopted together, in order toform a healthy “incentive and control” system. However, will different internal regulatory governance and equity incentive all exist as such “incentive and control” system? Will the impact of internal regulatory governance on manager’s equity incentive effect differ in different internal regulatory circumstances? These are the main issues of this article.This article selected the listed companies which have managerial ownership in 2006-2014 as the research samples, and choose institutional investors governance, large shareholders governance and QFII governance to represent internal regulatory governance mechanism, tryingto discover the impact of these three internal regulatory governance mechanism on the equity incentive effect through regression analysis. The article found the higher proportion ofshares institutional investors hold, the better effect the equity incentives make. In the sample companies with lower concentration of ownership, with the increasing concentration equity incentives also showed better incentive effect. In the sample companies with higher concentration of ownership, the large shareholders governance had no significant influences on the equity incentive effect. The listed companies without QFII holdings have significantly better incentive effect than the listed companies with QFII holdings. Meanwhile, this article has put forward corresponding policy suggestions according to above conclusions.更多还原