【作者】 石锐；

【导师】 郝颖；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 会计学， 2016， 硕士

【摘要】 在职消费问题一直都是国家和企业十分重视的问题之一,特别是对于国有企业的过度在职消费问题,更是受到广大人民群众乃至国内外媒体的关注。长久以来,国内外学者对在职消费的研究虽然已经比较全面和成熟了,但遗憾的是,诸多关于在职消费的文献都是针对微观层面与微观行为的研究,而针对宏观层面背景与微观企业行为的研究却较少,特别是在我国,与之相关的文献就更少了。中国作为世界上最大的转型经济国家,在改革发展的进程中,国有企业的管理效率,还有待进一步提高,特别是微观企业的在职消费监管问题。2012年2月13日,财政部联合国资委、审计署以及监察部等四部委联合发布关于印发《国企负责人职务消费行为监督管理暂行办法》(后简称“管理办法”)的通知,以此进一步贯彻落实国务院第四次廉政工作会议精神,严格规范国有企业负责人职务消费行为,坚决制止与企业经营管理无关的职务消费行为和奢侈消费风气。国家层面的“管理办法”以及各省、自治区、直辖市政府配套的监管措施作为一组外生政策,能够很好的弥补现有文献在微观企业在职消费选择上的不足。而本文则以此为背景,探究了外部监管对我国企业微观行为的影响及其经济后果。本文在“管理办法”等外部监管政策的背景下,选择2010-2014年我国A股上市公司作为研究对象,实证探究了外部监管对我国微观企业在职消费问题的影响及其经济后果,同时,也考察了外部监管在不同市场化进程下,对不同所有权性质企业的影响差异。根据实证研究,本文得出以下结论:(1)从整体上看,外部监管政策对市场起到了一定的净化作用,对我国企业在职消费问题有良好的抑制功效,特别是国有企业;(2)对于不同市场化进程下,不同所有权性质企业,外部监管的作用有一定差异,主要体现在,低市场化地区企业受到外部监管影响较高市场化地区企业更为明显,特别是非国有企业;(3)总的来说,外部监管对企业在职消费的抑制给企业业绩带来了正向作用,但在不同市场化进程下,不同所有权性质企业之间,其经济后果也有差异,具体体现在,对于中央国有企业而言,低市场化地区的企业更为有利,而对于地方国企和非国有企业而言,高市场化地区的企业更为有利。本文的研究不仅证明了中央监管的作用和效果,同时也提供了一个基于我国本土经验的实证研究,丰富相关文献的同时,也为我国政府制定更好的政策和制度提供了经验证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 Company-paid consumption has always been one of the problems highly-concerned by country and companies, especially for the state owned companies, whose excessive company-paid consumption attracts much concern from the people and the media at home and abroad. For a long time, research on company-paid consumption is comprehensive and mature, but unfortunately, most of the literature stands at the micro level, seldom research the micro company’s behavior on the macro background, especially in china, related literature is much rarer. China is the biggest transformed-economy country in the world, in its revolutionary development process, management efficiency of state owned companies remains further improvement, especially the company-paid consumption. On February 13 th 2012, the Ministry of Finance jointly State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Auditing Administration and Ministry of Supervision jointly issued the interim measures for the supervision and administration of position-related consumer behavior of executive officer of state-owned enterprises(hereinafter referred to as “management measure”), in order to further implement the conference spirit of state council for the fourth time honest work, strictly regulate the position consumer behavior of state-owned enterprise position, resolutely put a stop to position consumer behavior and luxury consumption culture which has nothing to do with the enterprise operation and management. As an exogenesis policy, the “management measure” at the national level and government regulations from provinces、autonomous regions and municipalities can remedy the insufficiency of company-paid consumption choice of current literature. Under this background, this paper analyzes the impact and economic outcome of external supervision to micro enterprise behavior.Based on the external supervision as the “management measure” background, this paper chooses Chinese A share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as research object, empirically researches the impact and economic outcome of external supervision to micro enterprise behavior, meanwhile, this paper studies the difference impacts of external supervision to differential property rights companies under different marketization process. From the empirical study, this paper gets the following conclusions:(1)As a whole, external supervision policy purifies the market in some degree, well restrains the company-paid consumption problem in companies, especially in state-owned companies.(2)Under different marketization process, the external supervision effects are different among companies whose property rights are different, specifically, compared with companies in high marketization degree region, companies especially the non-state owned companies in low marketization degree region get more significant impact from external supervision.(3) the suppression of external supervision to company-paid consumption has positive effects on performance of companies, but there is difference among state-owned and non-state owned companies under different marketization process, specifically, low marketization degree is much beneficial to central state-owned companies, while high marketization degree is much beneficial to regional state-owned companies and non-state owned companies. This research not only proves the impacts and efficiencies of central supervision, but also provides a domestic empirical study, which enriches the current related literature and empirical evidence for better policy and regulation making in China.更多还原