【作者】 李玲；

【导师】 石磊；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 土木工程管理， 2014， 硕士

【摘要】 招投标作为国际通用的建设工程项目采购制度在我国的应用日益广泛,引入招投标制度能够促进公平竞争,促进资源的最优配置,为业主带来显著的经济效益。自2000年招投标法颁布以来,我国的关于招投标的法律制度不断完善,针对必须招标的工程范围、招投标监督的职责分工、评标委员会的构成、评标方法的选择、招标代理机构的资质认定等问题逐一颁布实施及管理办法。然而招投标在我国的应用过程中存在很多问题,最低价格招标导致竞争加剧,过低的价格产生了许多劣质工程。综合评价招标中存在投标人贿赂评标专家的问题。以上问题与投标人参加招投标时的行为动机密切相关,因此有必要从招标人和投标人决策的视角,研究现行招投标制度中存在上述问题的内在原因及如何通过制度设计激励投标人遵守规章制度以改善上述非效率问题。针对建设工程项目的招投标制度,本文分为三个部分进行分析,第一部分从制度演化角度对我国招投标发展路径进行分析,总结招投标引入我国以来的发展历程,每个阶段的历史背景、制度规定、存在的问题及下一阶段的制度改进,在此基础上分析现行招投标制度的有效性。第二部分分析承包商和监理合谋导致最低价格招标中恶意报价发生的内在机制。研究发现当监理发现由于承包商的偷工减料而引起的工程质量问题时,承包商可以选择与监理合谋以逃避返修或返工成本,因此承包商可以通过事后和监理合谋弥补事前低价中标造成的损失。分析指出监理的有限责任导致对其罚款可以但无法完全抑制其与承包商之间的合谋,提出罚款结合监理的资质管理政策能够有效地抑制合谋,从而解决最低价格招标中存在的恶意报价问题。第三部分基于拍卖的机制设计理论构建综合评价招标模型,通过分析招标人和投标人之间的博弈过程,发现在招标人的评标准则完全体现社会价值时,综合评价招标法能实现资源的有效配置并使社会收益最大化。在此基础上论证引入设置最低分数的综合评价招标法能够在维持社会收益不变的同时提高招标人的财务效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 Bidding system in construction project has been more and more widely used in china recently and it also serves as a general contracting form in international construction field. The bidding system creates a fair environment for competition, promotes optimal resource allocation and brings much economic benefit for the purchaser. The legal system concerning bid and tender has been improved continually since the first bidding law in2000.Those laws set regulations for the problems such as what kinds of project must be purchased through bidding, who are responsible for supervising the process of the bid, what’s the principle for establishing bid evaluation committee, what kind of method is used to evaluate the tender, and the bid agency’s qualification management etc. Despite those regulations, there still exist many problems in bidding process. Excessive competition had been caused by the lowest price bid method, which led to a large number of jerry-built project as the price is too low to cover the normal cost. While in comprehensive bidding, bidders usually choose to bribe the experts who are responsible for evaluating the tender. Those issues are closely related to the motive of bidders during the tender. On that account, it’s very necessary to find the inner reason for those problems on the perspective of what bidders and tenders are decided on when bidding so that we can design system that provide enough incentive for the participators to obey and improve the inefficient phenomenon mentioned above.This article is divided into three parts to analyze the bidding system for construction project. The first part analyzes the progress of China’s bidding system, summarizes the history background regulations, laws and the existed problems concerned about bidding and how the government make measures to conquer them,based on what we could analyze whether they are efficient or not. The second part analyzes the actual mechanism of malicious quotation caused by the conspiracy between contractor and supervisor in the lowest-price-bidding. The conspiracy between contractor and supervisor can save contractor’s money from repairing or reworking once found by the supervisor when contractor offer project of inferior quality, which can offset the loss caused by low price tender when bidding. It shows that a penalty on contractor once collusion found can prohibit collusion to some extent, while it can’t eliminate the probability of conspiracy due to the limited responsibility of the supervisor. But strictly controlled qualification for the supervisor combined with penalty on contractor can solve this problem. In the third part, we build a model focus on the comprehensive bidding based on the theory of mechanism design, we find the equilibrium between the tender and bidders and it shows that comprehensive bidding can optimize the resource allocation and maximize the social surplus when the buyer’s evaluation standard is consistent with the whole society’s benefit.And the buyer can improve his expected return by set a minimum-score before the tender.更多还原