【作者】 张宇；

【导师】 任翠玉；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 东北地区上市公司的行业分布情况、存续状态以及经营状况与全国平均水平有着很大的差距,通过对东北地区已退市的上市公司进行分析可知这些公司普遍存在资金占用、关联担保、关联交易等各种大股东掏空上市公司的行为。鉴于此,本文以东北地区上市公司为研究对象,从内部治理结构和外部制度环境两个方面对东北地区上市公司大股东掏空行为进行影响因素的分析,以期通过本文的研究为抑制东北地区的大股东掏空行为提供理论基础和经验证据。从东北地区上市公司的实际情况分析,探寻影响大股东掏空行为的重要因素,具有理论和现实的双重价值。在理论上,采用区域性的数据作为研究对象,深化了对上市公司大股东掏空行为的研究；并探讨监事会在抑制大股东掏空行为中是否发挥作用。在现实意义方面,对投资者而言,有助于保护投资者的利益,提高投资者的热情；对上市公司自身而言,有利于形成统一的公司决策,提高上市公司的价值；对政府监管部门而言,有助于制定有效的规章制度,促进资本市场的健康发展。本文的研究方法以实证研究为主,规范研究和文献回顾为辅,采用东北地区非金融类A股上市公司2006-2010年的数据为研究样本,以大股东占款间接衡量掏空程度,对东北地区上市公司的大股东掏空行为进行实证检验。本文的研究内容共分为七个部分,各部分的基本内容如下：第一部分为绪论。这部分主要阐述了本文的一些基本问题,提出本文的研究背景和研究意义,并对国内外的相关文献进行梳理,在文献评述的基础上找到本文的出发点。第二部分为大股东掏空行为的相关理论。首先对掏空和大股东进行界定,然后阐述了相关的理论基础,最后从理论上分析了大股东掏空行为的途径。第三部分为东北地区上市公司的现状分析。主要从上市公司的行业分布状况、存续状态和经营状况三个方面进行分析。第四部分为东北地区上市公司大股东掏空行为影响因素的理论分析及假设提出。本部分在了解东北地区上市公司发展现状的基础上,采用规范研究的方法从内部治理和外部环境两个方面对大股东掏空行为的影响因素进行了分析,并提出了本文的假设。第五部分为研究设计。这部分提出了样本选取和相关指标确定的原则和方法,并构建研究模型,为实证检验做准备。第六部分为东北地区上市公司大股东掏空行为的实证检验。该部分是本文的重点内容,包括变量的描述性统计、相关性检验、多元回归分析和稳健性检验四个方面。第七部分为研究结论与政策建议。对实证研究的结果进行分析,并针对相关问题提出政策性建议,最后阐述本文研究的局限性和不足。本文的研究结论为：大股东持股比例和Z指数与大股东掏空程度呈显著正相关；大股东股权性质为国有、标准的审计意见和较好的企业经营环境对大股东的掏空程度具有显著的抑制作用。S指数、董事会特征和监事会特征对大股东的掏空行为影响不显著。本文在前人研究的基础上,主要在以下方面有所创新和贡献：一方面首次对区域性的大股东掏空行为进行探索性研究,采用东北地区上市公司为样本,不仅丰富了大股东掏空行为的研究内容,也拓宽了不同外部制度背景下大股东掏空行为的研究领域。另一方面针对现有研究较少讨论监事会作用的现状,将监事会的规模和监事会是否持股作为解释变量加入回归模型中,探讨监事会的特征对大股东掏空行为的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 There are large gaps upon the industry distribution, the existence state and the operating condition of the listed company between the northeast region and the average national level. According to the analysis of the delisted companies in the northeast region of China, there are various kinds of tunneling such as combines, associated guarantee, associated trade, etc. This article makes the listed companies in northeast area as the research object and conducts the analysis of the affecting factors from two aspects of the internal governance structure and the external system environment. Provide theoretical foundation and empirical evidence in order to curb the tunneling of the major shareholder.From the actual situation analysis of the listed company in the northeast region, there are theoretical and practical values to explore the influence of the important factors. In theory, making the regional data as the research object has deepened the research on the tunneling of the major shareholder and discussing the board of supervisors play the oral of supervising whether or not. In the real sense, for the investors, it is helpful to protect the interests of investors and improve investor enthusiasm. For the listed company itself, it is in favor of formatting a unified decision and improving the value of the listed company. For the government regulators, it is beneficial to make effective rules and regulations and promote the healthy development of the capital market.The empirical research method is applied in this article primarily; meanwhile the normative research method and the literature review method are done. The research samples are A-share listed companies of non-financial sectors in the northeast China from2006to2010. The tunneling is measured by the major shareholders combines indirectly.This paper includes the following seven parts:The first part is the introduction. This part puts forward the research background and significance, reviews the domestic and international related literatures. Then we found out the starting point on the basis of the relevant literatures summary.The second part is the relevant theoretical analysis of the major shareholders tunneling. Firstly, define the tunneling and the major shareholder. Then explain the basic theories. Last analysis the patterns of the major shareholders tunneling in order to lay a solid theoretical basis.The third part is the analysis of the listed company’s present situation in northeast China. The analysis have been carried on mainly from the listed company’s industry distribution, existence state and operating status.The fourth part, make the theoretical analysis and put forward assumption about the major shareholders tunneling of listed companies in the northeast area. After understanding the development present situation of the listed company in northeast China, to analysis the influencing factors from the internal management and the external environment, finally, to come up with the hypothesis of this paper.The fifth part is the study design. Provide the principles and methods about the sample selection and relevant index confirmation, construct the research model and prepare for the test.The sixth part, an empirical test of the major shareholders tunneling in the northeast listed company. This section is the main content of this paper, including the descriptive statistics of the variables, correlation inspection, and multiple regression analysis and stabilization inspection four aspects.Part7is the research conclusions and the policy recommendations. Summary the result of empirical research, put forward the policy suggestions on relevant issues, and expound the limitations and inadequate of this paper.The conclusion of the research is that the equity percentages of the big shareholder and Z index present significant positive correlations.big shareholder equity for state-owned properties, the standard auditing opinions and the better business environment play the inhibitory effect significantly. The influence of S index, the characteristics of the board of directors and the characteristics of the board of supervisor’s characteristics to the tunneling is not significant.On the basis of previous studies, this paper makes the following innovation and contribution. On the one hand, this paper makes the exploratory research on the regional research on determinants of major shareholders tunneling of listed companies. It not only enriches the content of research, but also broadens the field of research under the different external system background. On the other hand, the existing studies are discussed the role of the board of supervisors rarely. In this paper, the size of the board of supervisors and the holdings of the board of supervisors are added into the regression model in order to discuss the influence for the tunneling of major shareholders.更多还原