【作者】 王磊；

【导师】 邹世允；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 经济学， 2012， 硕士

【副题名】以上市公司控股股东为视角

【摘要】 公司控制权作为一项控制者对公司拥有的重大事项决策力和支配力,是股东所有权在公司管理中的集中体现,也是公司权利配置的核心,在现代公司制度中举足轻重。我国对公司控制权的研究主要侧重于经济研究,法律研究较为匮乏,上市公司控制权的法律研究就更为少见,而国内控股股东在行使上市公司控制权的过程中侵害其他股东、债权人等利益相关者甚至公司的现象司空见惯,倘若能设计好协调控股股东与其他利益相关者关系的法律约束机制,防止上市公司控股股东滥用控制权,那么对于我国资本市场的发展善莫大焉。本文将控制权置于上市公司环境下,通过理论和实证分析,以及比较研究,形成初步的约束控股股东行使控制权的法律机制,并对《公司法》为主线的法律法规提出一些改进建议。创新之处在于利用更丰富的资料来界定控股股东的方法并深化了控制权的概念和性质,并提出了上市公司控制权的现实基本问题是控股股东对少数股东权益剥夺,从公司内部环境和外部环境来建立约束机制。控制权的主体较为复杂,其中控股股东是最为典型的一类,本文从控股股东角度研究控制权,以获取一般性规则和经验。界定控股股东对于研究控制权具有重要意义,界定一般使用形式认定和实质认定双重标准。正确认识控制权的概念和性质,有利于界定控制权行使的范围和约束方式。权利说认为控制权是一种控制主体能够通过对公司施加控制性影响或者支配力而获取利益的权利,存在既定利益,也受法上之力保护,笔者认同这一看法。控股股东对上市公司控制权的行使存在着理论和现实上的困境。控制权使得资本多数决原则异化为控股股东排斥或忽略少数股东、左右从属公司的工具,从而使股东大会的民主决策机制丧失功能,公司意思、财产难以独立,股权实质上不平等。同时,控股股东作为股东享有有限责任的特权,却不放弃对公司财产的控制权,使得控股股东在有限责任原则的庇护下,“合法地”享有对从属公司财产和经营的支配性影响力、随意占用公司财产。控制权的行使与传统公司法上的公司法人人格独立原则、有限责任原则、股权平等原则均发生了冲突。控制权也使得原先公司治理的“三权分立”结构陷入被动,“董事会中心主义”无法落实,需要从控股股东与少数股东利益冲突的角度重新审视公司治理结构。我国上市公司控制权目前面临的现实基本问题在于控股股东对中小投资者的权益剥夺,并衍生出了对债权人权益、公司利益的侵害,具体包括对其他利益主体的损害、对上市公司独立性的损害等。本文从诚信义务、公司内部治理、债权人保护和外部市场等方面借鉴了发达国家法律约束机制的经验。我国上市公司股东大会制度存在较多问题,应加以完善。上市公司董事会构成的实践是控股股东选择董事的服从性、忠诚性的实践,但董事的选择标准更应是创造力,所以必须要有外部独立董事的存在。与任何经营实体一样,上市公司的运作离不开债的存在,为防止控股股东通过作为债务人的上市公司对债权人正当利益的损害,应建立债权人对债务人继续重大举债的无异议制度、银行对上市公司的相机治理制度。上市公司同样也适用法人人格否认制度,例如在人员混同、财产混同、虚假出资等情况下,法官可以考虑适用法人人格否认制度。但对有些行为适用法人格否定可能不尽合理,而不追究控制人的一定责任于债权人而言又显失公允,笔者主张对这类行为应适用公平原则。上述提到的都是公司内部环境,至于外部市场环境,是通过市场经济的宏观层面对公司经营加以影响。公司时刻处于市场之中,公司的控股股东也是公司经营风险的承担者,因此,有效地外部市场环境能够起到间接约束控股股东行为的作用。外部市场包括产品市场、资本市场、控制权交易等。本文限于篇幅和主旨的限制,仅就对控股股东如何行使控制权进行展开阐述,而如何建立良好的控制权行使法律约束机制还需要更进一步地探讨,本文先抛砖引玉,以引起更多人的思考和深化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Controlling authority of the company as a decision-making power and influence by controller on major matters of the company is the reflection of shareholder ownership in the commercial sphere, also the center of the configuration of the tools and all rights of the shareholders’ interests, in the modern corporate system which has a pivotal position. The study of corporate controlling authority in China mainly focuses on economic research despite of the paucity of legal research. Legal research of controlling authority over listed companies is even rarer. Domestic controlling shareholder in the process of exercising controlling authority of the company against the interests of the other shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders is even the company’s common phenomenon. Preventing the controlling shareholder of the listed company abusing of controlling authority is good in itself a remarkable achievement for the development of China’s capital market, where we can design good mechanism binding coordination of the relations between the controlling shareholder and other stakeholders.Mechanism of legal constraints over the exercise of controlling authority is preliminary forming through theoretical and empirical analysis and comparative study in listed company environment. I put forward some suggestions for improvement basing on the laws and regulations of main line on the Companies Act. This article has many innovations. It defines the method of controlling shareholder and deepens the concept and nature of the controlling authority in richer date. The realistic basic problems on listed companies are the controlling shareholder depriving the interests of minority shareholders. And I suggest from the company’s internal environment and external environment to create a constraint mechanism. The subjects over controlling authority in listed company are complex. The controlling shareholder is the most typical. This article studies to get the general rules and experience from the perspective of the controlling shareholders the controlling authority. Defining the controlling shareholder is of great significance for the study of the controlling authority. The identification generally uses double standards of form and substance. A correct understanding of the concept and nature of controlling authority is useful for defining the scope and constraints over its exercise. Theory of rights shows that the controlling authority can be applied by a controller to acquire the company’s interests of the controlling influence or dominance. There are vested interests, and also protection of the law force. I agree with this view.The exercise to controlling authority by the controlling shareholders of listed companies is of the theoretical and practical difficulties. Controlling authority makes the Majority Rule alienation exclusion become the instrument of controlling shareholders neglecting minority shareholders’right, and Playing with subordinate companies, so that the democratic decision-making mechanism of Shareholders’ meeting losses function, company’s property and Personality is not independent. At the same time, the controlling shareholder as shareholders enjoy the privilege of limited liability, but not give up control of the company’s property rights under the shelter of the principle of limited liability. The controlling shareholder legally is entitled the dominant influence on the company property and operation, random to take up the company’s property. The exercise to controlling authority conflicts the principle of the independence of the corporate personality, the principle of limited liability, the equity principle of equality clashed on the tradition of the Companies Act. Controlling authority also makes the original corporate governance structure of "separation of powers" fall into a passive position,"Board centrism" not be implemented. We need re-examine the structure of corporate governance from the view of the conflict on interests between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. The basic problem that Controlling authority in Listed companies in China faces is that the deprivation of the interests of the small and medium investors, the creditors, the company by controlling shareholder, including damage to other stakeholders, the independence of listed companies damage.This article draws the experience of the developed countries to mechanism of legal constraints from the duty of good faith, the company’s internal governance, creditor protection, and external market. Shareholders’meeting of listed companies should improve in China that has many problems. The practice of the board of listed companies is that the controlling shareholders choose Obedient and loyal directors. But the criteria of the directors should be creative. So there must be the presence of outside independent directors. Operation of listed companies can exist without the existence of the debt like any operating entity. The system that the debtor on the major credit continues borrowing without objection and the system of governance on publicly held corporations by banks should be established to prevent the controlling shareholder of listed companies damaging the legitimate interests of the creditors. The listed companies are also applying piercing corporation veil, for example mixed personnel, and mixed main assets, inveracious investment. But some acts which are applicable to piercing corporation veil unreasonably, but giving up certain responsibility to creditors obviously unfairly. I advocate such acts to apply the principle of fairness.The above mentioned is the internal environment. The external market environment is influenced by the macro-level of the market economy. The company is in the market at all times. The controlling shareholder of the company is alsa business risk undertakers. Therefore, the effective external market environment can play a role in the indirect constraint controlling shareholder behavior. External markets are including product markets, capital markets, and the market of controlling authority.This article that is limited by restrictions of the subject and space only elaborate how to exercise controlling authority by the controlling shareholder. How to establish legal constraints over the exercise of controlling authority need further exploration. This article first starts a discussion in order to attract more people’s thinking and deepened.更多还原