【作者】 刘红军；

【导师】 赵学锋；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 工商管理， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 二十世纪九十年代以来,我国高等教育进入了大众化发展阶段,研究生规模持续扩大。随着规模的扩大和多种社会因素的影响,研究生培养质量面临下滑的危险,研究生的学术不端行为愈演愈烈是突出表现之一。为了更好地了解研究生学术不端行为的表现形式,笔者设计了《研究生学术不端行为现状调查问卷》,对多所高校的上千名研究生为样本进行了问卷调查,总结出了多种典型的研究生学术不端行为表现形式:捏造或伪造实验数据、剽窃他人研究成果、一稿两投、请人代写论文或为别人代写论文、杜撰参考文献等。并根据调查问卷的数据进行了数据分析,绘出了各种学术不端行为的分布图,具体直观的反映了研究生学术不端行为存在的现状。为了探讨高校管理机构对研究生学术不端行为进行监管所涉及的经济学因素,建立了以高校管理机构和研究生作为博弈双方的混合策略博弈模型。首先探讨了博弈论对研究生学术不端行为监管问题的适应性;接着以高校管理机构对研究生采取监管或不监管,研究生采取学术不端行为或学术规范行为为策略集,建立混合策略模型;并求出了该模型的纳什均衡解。通过对纳什均衡解中各个因子:高校管理机构能准确确认研究生的学术不端行为获得的收益F1、研究生采取学术不端行为可获得收益F2、高校管理机构在实施监管时的成本C、研究生学术不端行为被查证后所面临的处罚W的量化分析,提出高校管理机构对研究生学术不端行为的具体监管措施。这些措施包括:高校应重视培养研究生高尚的学术道德情操、完善学术行为评价机制、降低高校管理机构查处研究生学术不端行为的成本、加大研究生学术不端行为被查证后面临的处罚力度。更多还原

【Abstract】 The higher education in China has been widely popularized ever since the 1990s with an increasingly expanded number of graduate students. However, the education quality of postgraduates tends to be declining due to the expanding enrollment scale as well as various social factors,and a distinct manifestation is the postgraduates’academic misconducts which become more and more serious.In order to know much clearer about the performances of the postgraduates’academic misconducts, the author designs a questionnaire on the current situation of postgraduates’academic misconducts, and survey the questionnaire whose sample are thousands of postgraduates from different universities. Based on the questionnaire, the author discovers many typical performances of the postgraduates’academic misconducts, such as fabricating or forging experiment data, plagiarizing the research results of other researchers, submitting one paper to two or more journals, having papers written by others or writing papers for others, feigning references and so on. Additionally, the author draws the distribution graph to illustrate the current state of all academic misconducts by analyzing the data from the questionnaire.In order to explore the economic factors of the supervision of the university administrative organizations on postgraduates’academic misconducts, the author establishes a mixed-strategy game model, taking university administrative organizations and postgraduates as the two parties. First of all, the adaptability of the game theory on the supervision of academic misconducts is discussed. Then a mixed-strategy model is established according to a strategy set, which covers the performances of the university administrative organizations toward the postgraduates, including supervising or not, and the academic behaviors of the postgraduates, such as misconducts or standard behaviors. Finally the Nash equilibrium solution is calculated under this model. The factors in the Nash equilibrium solution are F1 which is the income from the accurate confirmation of the postgraduates’academic misconducts, F2 which represents the income from the postgraduates’academic misconducts, C which is the cost of supervision of the university administrative organizations, and W, the penalty of the postgraduates face after their misconducts been confirmed. According to the quantitative analysis about those factors, the author offers some supervise measures, such as emphasizing the academic morality of postgraduates, improving the academic conducts evaluation mechanism, reducing the cost of the supervision on academic misconducts and increasing the penalty of the academic misconducts after been confirmed.更多还原