节点文献
外资持股与上市公司绩效
Foreign Shareholders and the Performance for Chinese Listed Companies
【作者】 陈龙;
【导师】 胡玉明;
【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 , 会计学, 2011, 硕士
【摘要】 改革开放三十多年来,中国经济的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就,而这些成就的取得与中国的招商引资政策是分不开的。外资持股中国上市公司的现象日益普遍,它们的出现促进了中国上市公司治理结构的变化,并影响着上市公司的业绩。随着经济的发展,外资在中国享受的“优惠待遇”逐渐转变成为“国民待遇”。在调整招商引资政策之前,政府必须弄清楚外资持股的持股方和被持股方的动机和热情如何,不同形式的国外资本会对不同控制权的中国上市公司的业绩产生怎样的影响。本文通过理论分析和实证得出以下结论:外资持股上市公司的绩效与外资持股比例负相关,与实际控制人性质为政府、国企和其他国有机构的上市公司相比,外资持股比例对非国有法人控制的外资持股上市公司的负面影响更大;外资金融机构持股的上市公司拥有更好的绩效;外资非金融机构持股的上市公司中,外资方委派董事高管的上市公司绩效更好。
【Abstract】 China wouldn’t have experienced such a fast and sustainable growth without the Policy of Reform and Opening up in the past 30 years. More and more listed companies in Chinese security exchange have foreign shareholders, whose appearance has promoted the change in the structure of corporate governance of the listed companies and influenced their performance.With the development of China’s economy, the treatments that the foreign investors were enjoying are transferring from favorable treatments to national ones. In the adjustment of the investment promotion policies, the government must know the motivation and enthusiasm of foreign shareholders and listed companies which have got foreign shareholders, and the effect of different forms of foreign capital invested into listed companies with different essential controller.This article draws following conclusions through the theoretical analysis and empirical study:The performance of listed companies with foreign shareholders is negatively correlated with the fraction of equity owned by foreigners, and the absolute value of the coefficient for firms controlled by non-state-owned legal person is bigger than for those controlled by the government, state-owned enterprises and other state-owned institutions. Listed companies with foreign institutional investors perform better. Foreign non-institutional shareholders that delegating directors or executives to the listed companies could bring the China’s companies a little better performance.
【Key words】 Foreign Shareholding; Ultimate Control Rights; Institutional Shareholding; Foreign Directors;