【作者】 高倩；

【导师】 孙烨；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 企业高管人员对会计独立性缺乏尊重,他们经常试图去支配财务、审计人员,怂恿他们掩盖企业真实的经营状况和现金流量甚至造假。作为“白领犯罪”(White Collar Crime)财务舞弊已有三百多年的历史,其波及面之广、冲击力之大、影响之深,举世震惊。世界资本市场正经历着一场令投资者和社会公众难以承受的诚信危机。如何有效的抑制上市公司财务舞弊行为,成为学术界不容忽视的难题。从理论上讲,作为公司治理机制的一份子,监事会对企业财务舞弊行为的发生有着监督和抑制作用。而另一方面,学术界对我国监事会治理是否有效一直没有形成一致结论。认为我国企业监事会治理无效、建议学习英美法系取缔监事会制度的学者比比皆是。但这些研究没有对监事会制度与企业外部治理和内部治理机制之间的内在关系进行深入研究,也缺乏具有说服力的实证结果支持。基于此,本文将对上市公司监事会是否能够抑制企业财务舞弊行为的发生进行实证分析,以弥补研究空白。本文选取2003年至2009年期间内我国沪深两市发生财务舞弊行为的上市公司作为研究样本,运用二元logistic模型,从监事会规模、监事会会议频率、监事会独立性和监事会持股比例等几个视角,对监事会特质与财务舞弊行为之间的相关关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:(1)监事会规模与企业财务舞弊行为呈U型关系,当监事会规模为3人到4人时,对企业财务舞弊的抑制效果最佳,当监事会规模小于最佳值或者大于最佳值时,监事会的监督职能不能得到充分有效的发挥,对企业财务舞弊行为的抑制效用也随之降低。(2)股权激励能够有效激发监事会成员监督的积极性和有效性,降低道德风险,这在当上市公司连续发生多次财务舞弊行为时更为明显。但现阶段我国监事会持股比例普遍偏低。(3)监事会会议召开次数与企业财务舞弊行为呈现正相关关系,监事会会议次数召开的频率从一个侧面反应了企业财务信息披露质量的隐患。而且,当企业仅出现一次财务舞弊行为时,监事会成员更倾向于通过召开监事会会议进行沟通;而随着企业财务舞弊次数的增多,监事会成员对召开监事会会议的积极性也随之下降。(4)监事会独立性的提高有助于监事会监督职能的充分有效发挥,从一定程度上抑制企业财务舞弊行为的发生。在实证研究的基础上,本文提出了政策建议和意见,即完善我国上市公司监事会制度有利于抑制企业财务舞弊行为的发生。包括提高监事会的独立性。本文的研究结果表明、严格控制监事会的运营成本、加强和健全监事会职权、完善监事会及其成员的激励约束机制、建立良好的声誉机制等五个方面。更多还原

【Abstract】 Because of lack of respect for the independence of the accounting, corporate executives often try to dominate finance staffs and audit staffs, encourage them to cover up the true state of business and corporate cash flow, or even fraud. As "white-collar crime", financial fraud has three hundred years of history, with a large and deep impact shocking the world. World capital market is experiencing a crisis, which makes public investors unbearable .How to effectively inhibit the listed company’s financial fraud, has become a problem which academia cannot ignored .Theoretically, as part of corporate governance, board of supervisors could monitor and inhibition the occurrence of corporate financial fraud .On the other hand, academics governance have not formed the same conclusion about the effectiveness of the board of supervisors. Many scholars consider that the governance of board of supervisors is ineffective, and suggest banning the supervision board like Anglo-American law. However, these studies did not have a depth research on the intrinsic relationship between the governance of board of supervisors, external supervisory system, and internal governance mechanisms, but also lack convincing empirical results to support. Based on this, this paper will make empirical analysis about if the board of supervisors of listed companies will be able to suppress the occurrence of corporate financial fraud , in order to make up for gaps in research. Selecting China’s listed companies in financial fraud from 2003 to 2009 period as the study sample, using binary logistic model, scaling from the board of supervisors, board of supervisors meeting frequency, independence of supervisory board ,and the shareholding, this paper make an empirical study about the relationship between characteristics of the board of supervisors and financial fraud.The results show that: (1) Size of board of supervisors and corporate financial fraud has a U-shaped relationship, and when size of the board of supervisors is 3 or 4, the inhibitory effect of corporate financial fraud is best. Smaller or greater than optimal value, the oversight functions of the board of supervisors cannot be fully effective play on the corporate financial fraud as well as reduce the inhibitory effect. (2) but the shareholding of supervisory board is generally low in China;Shareholding incentive can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm and supervisory effectiveness of the board of supervisor members, and reduce moral hazard, which occurs more obvious when financial fraud happen several times in one company.(3)The number of board of supervisors meeting and corporate financial fraud have a positive correlation; frequency of supervisors board meetings held in response from one side of the quality risks about business financial information disclosure.In addition, when financial fraud occur only once in one company, the supervisory board members tend to communicate through holding board meetings; but with the increase of the number of financial fraud, numbers of supervisors meeting is reduced .(4)The independence of supervisor board will help increase the functions of supervision effectively, and reduce the occurrence of corporate financial fraud to some extent.Based on the empirical study,this paper proposes that board of supervisors can suppress the occurrence of corporate financial fraud of listed companies. Such as enhancing the independence of the board of supervisor, Strict controlling the operating costs of board of supervisors, to strengthen and improve the terms of board of supervisors, improve the incentive mechanism, and establishing a good reputation mechanism.更多还原