【作者】 杨青；

【导师】 管毅平；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 西方经济学， 2010， 硕士

【副题名】以中国国有企业为例

【摘要】 ?I国有企业是政府针对可能出现的市场失灵问题而采取的一种参与和干预经济的工具与手段,政府的目标通常分为经济性目标和非经济目标两类。因此,国有企业的最终任务可以分为追求经济目标的经营性任务和追求非经济目标的政策性任务两类。国有企业多任务问题增加了对经营者业绩测量的难度,增大了经营者机会主义行为的空间。在不易受到监督的经营性任务上,经营者可能会降低努力程度,把经营性任务的难以实现归结为承担政策性任务的后果。国有企业承担的政府赋予的政策性任务,未必是国有企业自愿承担的任务,更不是企业经营者主动追求的目标。当政策性任务为政府带来的收益较高时,政府不得不容忍国有企业在经营性任务上的懈怠,甚至为国有企业弥补亏损,进而就产生了软预算约束问题。对国有企业的这种不当激励与约束会导致企业生产效率的下降,由于国有企业多重任务的存在,结果政府可能会牺牲高昂的经济目标,却仅获得了有限的社会(非经济)目标,降低社会的整体福利。本文运用委托代理模型,分析了国有企业面临多任务时的激励机制;并运用动态博弈模型,分析了国有企业的多任务与软预算约束的关系。为了使国有企业如政府所愿实现所有的目标,首先需要解决国有企业的任务分配问题,然后采取相容的激励措施促使国有企业经营者适当分配努力保证既定任务的完成。也就是从外部与内部两个角度对国有企业进行约束与激励。只有各项任务的努力所产生的业绩可以准确测量时,激励与约束才是有效的。当经营者同时从事多项任务,如果其中一项任务难以有效监督,则不应该对其他任务进行过度激励。因此,若存在不易于监督的任务时,解决问题的途径要么是将多项任务的目标尽量单一化,要么就是强化不易于监督任务的激励与监督,或者弱化对易于监督任务的激励与约束。如果国有企业经理的经营性努力相对不易被监督,并且在政策性任务上的努力会增加经营性努力的成本,而政府又对政策性任务较为看重时,为了避免软预算约束问题,就需要尽量分离政策性任务,降低国有企业承担政策性任务给政府带来的收益,转而由专门的机构来完成这种任务。同时,政府层面的财政硬约束也会硬化国有企业的预算约束。更多还原

【Abstract】 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) act as an instrumentality for the government participating in and intervening in the economy to solve the problem of market failures. The goals of government can usually be separated into two categories– the economic goal and the non-economic goal. Therefore, all the tasks of SOEs can be classified into two kinds– the operation task for economic goals and the policy task for non-economic goals. The existence of multitask for the SOEs makes it difficult to measure the managers’performance, which leaves space for opportunism behaviors. Managers may tend to make fewer efforts on the unobservable operation task and ascribe uncompleted tasks to the burden of policy tasks. Since policy tasks, which SOEs might not be willing to take, are appointed by the government, when the payoff of policy tasks for the government is high enough, the government has to endure managers shirking the operation tasks. The government may have to support SOEs running under deficit, which raises the problem of the soft budget constraints. The improper incentives and constraints lead to the inefficiency, where the government realizes limited social goals while satisfying large economic benefits.The paper analyzes incentive mechanism of multitasking SOEs by the principal-agent model as well as the relation between multitasking and soft budget constraints of SOEs by the dynamic game model.To realize all the goals of the government, the first problem to solve is the allocation of tasks between SOEs, and the second action is to design compatible incentive measure to ensure managers’effort on tasks.Only if the efforts on each task can be measured accurately, should the incentives and constraints be efficient. Taking multiple tasks with one of them hard to observe, managers’should not be given excess incentives on other tasks. To solve the problem of shirking, the tasks should be assigned to different entities or there should be appropriate incentives.When SOEs managers’efforts on operation tasks are hard to supervise and enhancing the efforts on policy tasks increases the cost of efforts on operation tasks, the tasks should be separated to avoid the problem of soft budget constraints. At the same time, tight constraints on the government finance will also harden the budget constraints of SOEs.更多还原