晋升激励与经济发展：一个分析框架及其在中国经济中的应用

【作者】 刘瑞明；

【导师】 白永秀；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 中国过去将近三十年的经济高速增长,始终是一个未解之谜。但总体来看,中国经济增速的三十年,是中国从计划体制走向市场体制的三十年。如果我们将计划体制与市场体制看作是两种不同的合约结构,那么,二者的融合过程是否意味着经济绩效的改变呢?众所周知,在这一转变的过程中,政府扮演了极其重要的角色。从中国的实践来看,政府的配额交易相对于市场中的买卖交易和企业的管理交易来说,处在中心和支配地位。这刚好与诺斯的理论相对应,经济增长的基石是国家、产权和有效率的组织,而政府作为连接它们的纽带处于经济增长的中心。根据转型经济学的研究,中国的经济呈现出强烈的组织特征,并且,政治治理结构的转变对经济绩效起到重大影响。因此,对于政府组织的经济性质以及其内部激励结构的考察应该对理解现实具有重大作用。现代组织经济学的一个研究成果是,在信息完全的情景下,组织中晋升激励机制的应用也可导致帕累托最优的产出。这一理论成就说明,即使在社会主义,运用合适的激励机制也可以取得良好的经济绩效。因此,从晋升激励为突破口来理解中国经济绩效的转变就成为一种可能。本文以“晋升激励与经济发展:一个分析框架及其在中国经济中的应用”为题,集中考察组织中的晋升激励与中国经济发展中的若干问题,达到一些有益的理解。在理论部分,本文首先在制度经济学基础上以分工、交易、交易费用与制度安排为关键词理出历史发展的一条红线,接着描述传统社会主义经济体制中的若干特征性事实,考察其分工、激励与经济绩效,建立了一个转型社会主义经济中的晋升激励与经济发展的分析框架。在应用分析部分,我们将构建的理论框架应用到中国经济现实中去,具体考察区域可持续发展、地方保护和经济周期几个问题。研究发现,地方政府的区域非可持续发展行为、产业同构及其引发的地方保护以及经济的周期性波动都是晋升激励体制的必然结果。根据我们的理论,晋升激励机制是政府主导型经济中避免政治代理人的道德风险的必要激励手段,如果放弃了对政府官员的相对绩效的考核,政府官员就不会有强大的推动地方经济发展的动力,从而政府主导型的经济也就无从发展。但由于绩效考核的不完善和地区政府官员对地区长远利益的偏离,这种激励机制面临着高昂的代价。从改革的实践来看,虽然晋升激励下政府推动型的经济增长方式在改革开放的过程中,构成了我国经济增长奇迹的重要来源,但是在以GDP为衡量指标的绩效考核中,经济增长的质量越来越受到人们的质疑。从短期看,完善政府绩效评价机制,降低地方生产总值和地方财政收入增长等指标的重要性,把地方政府的非可持续发展、经济成本、地方保护和市场分割行为的削减纳入考核体系将有利于经济的健康成长。但这些措施并不能从根本上解决组织激励中相对绩效考核的必要性与由此而来的经济低效发展之间的矛盾。而我国改革开放的经济史至少可以证明,对私人产权的赋予和保护,使得经济主体能够从比较优势的角度出发,发展具有自生能力的产业,从而经济才能快速健康的成长。因此,长期的改革方向必然是对私人产权的赋予和保护,创造良好的市场环境,对良性竞争与地区间分工协作的激励等。政府的职能也需由经济参与者向经济规则、秩序的维护者转变。我们所能给出的指向性导引是:出于交易成本的节约,中国必然要从等级制产权走向市场型产权,这意味着计划的逐渐瓦解和市场的逐步建立,而这依赖于产权的改革进程。更多还原

【Abstract】 It remains a enigma that China’s rapid economic growth in the past nearly 30 years. But overall, the China’s economic growth for 30 years is the transition from planning system to market system for 30 years. If we viewed planned system and the market system as two different structure of the contract, then the integration process of them does mean that the performance of the economy changed? As we all know, in this transformation process, the government plays an extremely important role. From China’s practice, relative to the market transactions and enterprise management transactions, the government’s quota transactions acquire the dominant position at center. This is exactly corresponding what North’s theory: national, property rights and an efficient organization is the cornerstone of economic growth and the government as a link connecting them at the center of economic growth. According to the study of transition economics, China’s economy has seen strong organizational characteristics, and political governance change in the structure of the economy have a significant impact on performance. Therefore, it is play a very important role to understand the economic performance that investigation of the nature of the government organization and economic incentive structure of it.One research results of Modern organizational economics is that the organization promotion based incentive mechanisms can lead to Pareto optimal output if the information is perfect. Note achievements of this theory, even in socialism, the appropriate use of incentive mechanisms can achieve good economic performance. Therefore, from the promotion based incentives as a breakthrough to understand China’s economic performance on the changes as a possibility. In this paper, we explain a number of issues in the transtional China under the title of "Promotion based incentives and economic development : an analytical framework and its Application to the Chinese economy" and achieve some useful understanding. In the part of theory, we first found a key clue of economic development on the basis of the division in economics, the transaction costs and institutional arrangements for Keywords, and then describe a number of stylized facts in the traditional socialist economic system, examine its division, incentive and economic performance, establish a analytical framework of transition socialist economy. In the application analysis part of this paper, we applied this framework to the Chinese economy, the study found that local regional non-sustainable development, same industrial structure and local protection triggered by it and the cyclical fluctuations are the inevitable results of the promotion based incentives system.According to our theory, promotion based incentives mechanism is necessary to avoid the moral hazard of political agent in a government-dominated economy, if we gave up the relative performance examination of government officials, government officials will be no strong impetus to local economic development momentum, then the government-dominated economy is impossible to develop. However, the performance evaluation is incomplete, and the government officials on the deviation of regional long-term interests, such incentives are facing a high cost, the quality of economic growth increasingly has been called into question. Looking at the short term, to improve the government’s performance evaluation mechanism, such as reducing local GDP and local fiscal revenue growth targets, take the importance of local non-sustainable development, economic costs, local protectionism and market segmentation into the evaluation system will be conducive to the healthy economic growth. But these measures will not fundamentally solve the contradiction between the need for relative performance evaluation based incentive in a orgnization and the resulting inefficiency of the economic development. The history of China’s economic reform and opening up can prove at least, the empowerment and protection of the private property rights to make the economy exert the comparative advantages and develop the viable industry, which can be make the economic growth rapid and healthy. Therefore, the long-term direction of reform must be on the empowerment and protection of private property rights to create a market environment for healthy competition and cooperation. The functions of government are required from a economic actor to a maker of economic rules. We can give the directional guidance : For the transaction cost savings, China surely transit from grading system to market-based property ownership, which means the gradual disintegration of the grading system and the gradual establishment of the market system, which depends on property rights reform process.更多还原