【作者】 张芳；

【导师】 曾祥金；

【作者基本信息】 武汉理工大学 ， 应用数学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 供应链企业是以充分信任基础上的合作和企业之间很好的协调为基础，这条链上的企业必须达到同步、协调运作，才有可能使所有企业都能受益。但是由于各成员的利益和职责不同，导致他们的局部利益与整个供应链系统的目标不一致，致使整个系统的性能降低。相互之间缺乏有效的监督机制和激励机制是供应链企业之间合作性不稳固的原因。因此如何有效解决作为委托人的供应商和作为代理人的零售商之间的代理问题是确保供应链有效性的一个重要因素，而委托—代理理论已经成为研究信息不对称问题的标准框架。如何建立有效的供应链代理人激励约束机制，本文在现有文献和已有研究成果的基础上，采用博弈论的方法来分析代理人的行为，建立了信息不对称下代理人行为激励约束博弈模型，建立了供应链企业的最优动态激励约束机制。本文分为五部分：第一章为绪论，详细介绍了该学位论文的研究背景、研究的现实意义、国内外研究文献综述、选题的依据、研究的内容以及本文的创新之处；第二章为委托—代理理论的回顾，该部分主要从委托—代理关系的产生和发展、委托—代理理论的假设前提等几个方面给出了委托—代理理论的基本框架以及应用于现实中的扩展模型；第三章为建立激励约束机制数学博弈模型，首先构造了显性激励机制的数学模型，给出了信息对称、信息不对称条件下激励机制的有关特征和相关解释，然后在显性激励模型中加入新的变量构造了基于相对业绩比较的激励机制模型，最后针对一个隐性激励机制的数学模型，分析了声誉效应在解决代理问题中起的作用；第四章建立了供应链的激励机制模型，提出了三种类型的供应链激励机制：信息对称和信息不对称情况下的显性激励机制、基于相对业绩比较的供应链激励机制、声誉机制与显性机制相结合的供应链最优动态激励机制，并对以上模型做了详细的比较分析，得出了很有价值的结论：第五章对全文进行了总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 The supply chain enterprises are based on the full trust and the good coordination, enterprises on this chain must achieve synchronization, only then has the possibility to enable all enterprises with profit. But various members’ benefit and responsibility are different, so their local interest are not in consistent with the goal of the supply chain system, and the performance of the overall system to be reduced. The lacks of the effective surveillance mechanism and the incentive mechanism is the reason of unstable between the supply chain enterprises. Therefore how to solve the angent problem between supplier who is a principal and retailer who is an agent merchant’s is an important attribute, and the principal-agency theory already to be standard frame which is used to researching the problem when information is notsymmetry.How to establish an effective incentive-constrain mechanism for an agent of the supply chain? In this article, based on ready reference and research, we provide incentive-constrain game model of agent with game theory on condition that the information is notsymmetry between principal and agent. In this way, we establish the model of optimal dynamic incentive mechanism for the supply chain enterprise.The article includes five parts. The chapter one is introduction. This part introduces the research background, practical significance, summarize of the domestic and foreign research literature, topic basis, research content as well as innovations of the article. The chapter two is principal-agency theory review. This part provides the basic model of principal-agency and summarize extend model of principal-agency through introducing the development of principal-agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on. In the chapter three, in which establishes an incentive-constrain mechanism game model. First it structure an explicit incentive mechanism of mathematical model, which give the related characteristic and the correlation explanation under the information symmetry and asymmetrical condition, then joined a new variable in it and structure an incentive mechanism model under the relative achievement comparison, finally aimed at a mathematical model of the recessive incentive mechanism, which analyze the function of the reputation effect in the agency question. The chapter four, in which established three kinds of supply chain incentive mechanism model: the explicit incentive mechanism under information symmetry and asymmetrical condition, the relative achievement comparison incentive mechanism model and the model of optimal dynamic incentive mechanism. The chapter five is conclusion of the article.更多还原