节点文献

房地产开发商与代理商之间委托代理关系研究

Study on the Principal-agent Relationship between the Real Estate Developer and the Agent

【作者】 周丹

【导师】 彭晓东;

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 , 管理科学与工程, 2007, 硕士

【摘要】 房地产代理在国外的发展历史比较悠久,在中国台湾和香港地区也己经有了30多年历史,而我国大陆地区的房地产代理业起步较晚,90年代才逐渐发展起来。房地产开发商聘请代理商为其楼盘进行策划、代理和销售等工作,在一定程度上可以达到分工,提高效率。但是,这同样也会由于房地产开发商和房地产代理商之间的信息不对称,引发道德风险和逆向选择问题,导致市场的低效率。本文正是基于这样的认识展开研究。本文首先综述了委托代理理论的基本内涵和研究现状,然后根据委托代理理论的思想,针对房地产的特点,指出了房地产委托代理模型和传统委托代理模型的三点区别:房地产开发商的收入函数与楼盘体量相关,一般情况下开发商和代理商关于楼盘品质的评估存在着差异,代理人努力程度和楼盘品质对收入的影响程度随着市场的变化而变化,并且根据这些区别建立了房地产委托代理模型。然后在此基础上进行了开发商和代理商关于楼盘品质评估相同情况下、评估不同情况下和加入其他可观测变量三种情况下的显性契约设计,以及考虑代理人市场和考虑相对绩效两种情况下的隐性契约设计来解决道德风险问题。对于委托代理中的另外一个问题:逆向选择问题,我们采用了模糊综合评价方法,提出了应用二级模糊综合评价来评估代理商的能力,使得开发商对于代理商的能力有比较可靠的评估,从而迫使能力低的代理商退出市场,解决逆向选择的问题。在文章的最后,我们指出了文章的一些创新和存在的一些不足。

【Abstract】 There is a long history of development in foreign real estate agents, and both in Taiwan and Hong Kong still has been with 30 years. However, mainland’s real estate agent market got a later start. Real estate developers employ agents for sale and planning ,to a certain extent, this can be more efficient. Nevertheless, that will lead to the situation of asymmetric information between the property developers and real estate agents, which may result in low efficiency in the market caused by moral hazard problems.This dissertation introduces the concept and the chief content of principal-agent theory firstly. Then according the main ideology of principal-agent theory and the characteristic of real estate ,we find out 3 differences between the real estate principal-agent model and The traditional principal-agent model : 1、The income function of real estate developer related to the quantity of the building. 2、Different results exist between real estate developer and the agent in evaluation of the building. 3、The modulus of the effort of agent and the quantity of the building to the income function changing with the market developing. Based on them, we construct an principal-agent model on the foundation of this three differences. After this , we discussed explicit incentive mechanism design in different situation for example , in the situation of real estate developer and real estate agent have the same assess of the quality of the real estate, and in the situation of real estate developer and real estate agent have the different assess of the quality of the real estate , and so on . Then we discuss the contract design based on agents market and the relative performance . To the converse selection , we use fuzzy comprehensive evaluation on agent . so that it can force the agent whose ability is low off the market . At the final part of this research some innovation and deficiencies of the article were pointed out.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 重庆大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2007年 06期
  • 【分类号】F273.3
  • 【被引频次】10
  • 【下载频次】647
节点文献中: