【作者】 孙晓琳；

【导师】 唐绍欣；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 西方经济学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 目前，地方政府投资已成为经济增长的内生变量，在改善基础设施、拉动经济增长方面的积极作用巨大。但是，我国地方政府的投资存在着大量短期化、急功近利、不计成本、重复建设的行为，为我国经济发展埋下极大的隐患。研究地方政府投资扩张的原因，规范其投资行为具有非常重要的现实意义。综观我国地方政府投资扩张的成因，预算软约束的作用贯穿始终。而现有的研究却都仅仅把预算软约束孤立的看做是众多原因中的一个来分析，缺乏对二者之间关系的一个全面系统的分析。本文从我国现行的制度机制出发，详细分析了我国地方政府投资中的预算软约束问题出现的制度成因，结合地方政府投资动机和相关博弈分析，提出有针对性的对策建议。制度带有根本性、全局性、稳定性和规范性，研究转型期地方政府投资行为中预算软约束形成的原因应该从制度入手，从行政集权下的财政分权体制、不完善的投融资体制、模糊产权、激励机制与政绩合法化建设以及约束机制六个方面来分析。地方政府投资行为的基本动机可以概括为两个方面：一是地区社会福利的最大化；二是地方官员个人福利的最大化。这二者唯有“经济发展”的基础上才能达成一致。因此，发展经济，增加地方财政收入成为地方政府的头等重要的任务，由此产生了地方政府投资扩张的偏好。地方政府的投资行为表现为地方政府与中央政府、地方政府与辖区内微观主体以及地方政府之间的博弈行为。其中，地方政府与中央政府和当地微观主体的博弈皆因为信息的不对称而有利于地方政府，由于地方政府不能照顾“大局”，导致地方政府对经济增长速度的盲目追求和中央宏观调控的困难；另一方面，地方政府间的博弈又带来了投资的扩张冲动、投资结构趋同和过度竞争，地方的投资冲动和恶性竞争倾向进一步加剧。本文最后给出了规范地方政府投资行为的对策建议。根本的是要进一步推进改革和制度创新：建立科学合理的政绩考核体系；进一步完善财政管理体制改革；加快投融资体制改革；继续推进产权改革，提高投资效率；改善投资软环境。更多还原

【Abstract】 Local government investment is the endogenetic variable for the economic growth now, which plays an important role in improving infrastructure and accelerating economy development. But there are many badly hidden dangers for the economy development , such as short-term behaviors, blindness pursuing after interests, no cost counting, repetitive construction .It is of great significance searching the reasons of the local government investment expansion and standardize the investment behavior of local government.Making a comprehensive view of the reasons for the investment expansion of local government, we can find that the soft budget constraint impenetrates every factor. But, the present study about this only regards the soft budget constraint as the sole reason, which lacks of a comprehensive and systematic studying on the interrelation between them. This paper analyses the institutional genesis of the soft budget constraint for local government investment, the motive of the local government’s investment and interrelated game analysis, basing on the present institutional environment. In the end, this paper makes some pertinence suggests.Institution is characterized as fundamentality, integrality, stability and standardization. So we can start on the institutional genesis of the soft budget constraint when we study the investment behaviors of local government in transition economy. The paper analysis the subject under six mechanisms as follows: centralization and fiscal decentralization, incomplete investment and financial systems, ambiguous property rights systems, incentive mechanism and achievement-projects legalization, restriction mechanism.The motive of the local government’s investment can be summarized in two respects: The regional social welfare maximization and officers’ personal welfare maximization. They can only be consistent with each other on the basis of economic development. Therefore, the most important task for local government is to develop economy which causes partiality of impulse of expansion.The investment behavior of the local government is a chess match behavior between the local and central government , between local government and micro main bodies, among local governments. The game behaviors of local and central government and the game behaviors among local government and micro main body are beneficial for local government because of information asymmetry. Furthermore, it can cause the difficulty for central macro adjustments. On the other hand, local intergovernmental chess matches bring the repetitive construction and the excessive competition , which aggravates investment impulsion and malignant competition.The paper makes some pertinence suggestions in the end . The prime measure for rationalizing behaviors’ of local governmental investment is to advance the reform of system further and to innovate the existing system: constituting scientific and rational merit system, advancing the reform of fiscal management, quickening the reform of investment and financing systems, proceeding with property right reform and improving investment environment.更多还原