关联担保、隧道效应与公司价值

【作者】 朱媚；

【导师】 郑建明；

【作者基本信息】 对外经济贸易大学 ， 会计， 2007， 硕士

【副题名】来自中国上市公司的证据

【摘要】 本文以1998-2004年765家对外提供关联担保的上市公司为样本,考察了关联担保程度与企业价值的关系。同时截取2004年的225个样本公司,采用Logistic回归,检验了非正常关联担保发生概率与股权结构、自由现金流以及上市公司所在地区信贷分配市场化程度的关系。最后,根据关联担保对象,以1998-2004年仅发生一种类型关联担保的390家公司为样本,研究了不同类型关联担保对企业价值的影响差异。我们发现,关联担保程度与企业价值显著负相关,关联担保的程度越大,对企业的价值侵害程度越高,证实了关联担保确实是控制性股东对上市公司进行利益侵占的形式之一。其次,企业财务杠杆和自由现金流量水平越高,发生非正常关联担保的相对概率越大,而最终股东持股比例越高,上市公司所在地区信贷分配的市场化指数越大,发生非正常关联担保的相对概率则越小。最后,不同类型的关联担保对企业价值的影响程度是有差异的。相对于其他关联方,上市公司向控股股东提供关联担保对企业价值的损害程度最大。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the sample of 765 listed companies in China stock market from 1998 to 2004, this paper investigates the relationship between connected-party guarantees and firm value. Meanwhile, it tests the sub-sample with 225 companies in 2004 by Logistic model for the impact of ownership structure, residual cash flow and credit index of the province where the listed company was born on the probability of abnormal connected-party guarantees. Finally, sorted by the receiptor of guarantees, the sample can be retained again with 390 companies to be tested for the different effect among different guarantee types. We find that, connected-party guarantee degree is negatively correlated with firm value. The higher the degree, the stronger the expropriation effect, which gives evidence that connected-party guarantee is one of controlling shareholders’expropriation behaviors. The results also confirm that leverage and residual cash flow rate positively affect the probability of abnormal connected-party guarantees, but the ultimate ownership and credit distribution index are opposite. Lastly, different types have different influence on firm value. Compared with other types, guarantees for controlling shareholders have a more significant tunneling effect on listed companies.更多还原