【作者】 张鹏；

【导师】 沈维涛；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 企业管理， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 从静态上看,控制权表现为控制权的结构和状态;在动态上表现为一系列控制权变更的过程和机制。控制权作为现代企业的“基因”,控制权有效配置是解决公司治理的核心和关键,强化控制权机制是完善公司治理的现实选择和战略趋向。在中国证券市场,上市公司处于大股东超强控制状态,为了有效控制大股东治理所带来的巨大成本,控制权市场能否发挥外部治理性,实现其资源优化配置作用,即中国控制权市场绩效是本文所要研究的重点。中国控制权变更事件每年以70%的增长率上升,但是在其繁荣表象的背后,中国独特的股权结构以及不完善的法律环境,决定了控制权供求双方共同的机会主义行为,使得股市只能作为融资场所而不是控制权市场的有效载体。在比较事件研究法以及会计指标法后,鉴于中国股市市场信号噪音过大,信息传递失真问题严重,本文采用会计研究法进行实证研究。结合国内研究实践,本文吸收了八个财务指标进行公司业绩评价,运用因子分析,提取关键因子,计算在控制权变更前后年度企业绩效得分,并分析总体变化趋势,得到了变更后公司业绩出现短期强力反弹然后逐步下降的现象,可以看到由于中国控制权市场“有接管而无威胁”,控制权变更并没有真正改变公司经营状况,控制权市场的外部治理效应不佳,未能实现上市公司资源优化配置。对于其控制权变更后所带来的短期的绩效反弹,主营业务的改善只有小部分贡献,且持续性较差,而绝大部分的持续性的利润贡献则来自于控股股东刻意为之的盈余管理项目,由于目前的监管体系越来越严,营业外收支以及关联交易形成的资产重组代替传统手法构成了盈余管理的主要渠道。因此控制权变更事件并没有产生真正的经济价值,中国控制权市场符合财富转移假说,即控制权变更只是一场新的财富再分配游戏,最终损失的仍然是中小股民利益。最后根据全文的实证以及理论分析,提出政策建议,认为目前实行的股权分置试点改革有利于改善我国长期存在的特殊的分割的股权结构,结合控制权市场微观市场制度以及控制权定价体制的完善,改革对于上市公司业绩评价系统,并且加强政府职能的完善和改变,可以改善我国控制权市场的作用以及运营环境和机制,最终实现其资源优化配置作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the static eyes on, control rights were the structures and situations; However, from the dynamic eyes on, they were rings of procedures and mechanisms of control rights transferring. As the "genes" of modern companies, control rights’ having been effectively distributed was the key and core of solving the corporate governance, and strengthening the control rights mechanisms was the practical choices and strategic trends of improving the corporate governance. In Chian stock market, lots of list companies were charged by large shareholders. To control and reduce the cost of large shareholder governence, it defines to the market for corporate control in China. So this paper will focus on the siginificance of cultivating a an effcient market of corporate control, which can carry out exterior mechanism and resource allocation function, in fact, about performance of the market of corpotae control in China.The number of event of corporate control transferring increased at 70% during last few years. But in the back of this flourishing phenomena, it show out a low performance market. The special sotck property strctures and incomplete law and system environment decide the same opportunistic conduct operated by both corporate control suppliers and buyers and made the stock market become only financing approach for list companies instead of efficient carrier of market for corporate control.After comparing The Event Studies and The Accouting Studies, considered of the problem of information nosies and distortion, this paper applies the later one to do empirical analysis. According to researches done before, this paper absorbes eight financial index to value corporate performance. Using the factor analysis method, four main component were get and the socore for the list companies which change their large shareholders can be calculated. Analysis the changing trend of their scores, it’s shown that after the transferring, the performance seems to rebound strongly in next year but soonly get down. Because of useless of market for corporate control, corpotae takeover didn’t equal to threat. The transferring didn’t change the real performance and operation of list companies in fact, and the function of exteriormechanism and the optimization of social resource allocation hasn’t work very well.When it mentions about the reboud in the next year after the transferring, it need to know the real structure of return source. The contribution made by profit from main operations is just a small part of the increase and it cann’t maintain. In contrast, durative investment income and non-operating revenue play important roles in the rebound. So earning management conduct after corporate control transferring were notable and its two popular way are capital reorganization and non-opreating revenue. In conclusion,“Wealth Transfer Hypothesis”adapt to China corporate control market. The transferrings were just wealth allocation game, frome one large sharrholder to another one, with no real social weath producing. The great loss and the cost of transferrings are accepted by minority shareholders.According to empirical and theory analysis, it’s recommended that the stock innovation practised now is good to ameliorate stock property structures which exsited for long time. Also to improve the efficiency of performance valuation system and law restriction and the functions of directorate are useful ways to meliorate the market for corporate control in China.更多还原