【作者】 王斌；

【导师】 余珊萍；

【作者基本信息】 东南大学 ， 金融学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 通过将中小企业的融资困境置于信贷配给的框架下进行考察,发现中小企业信用困境的原因在于其特定信息结构所对应的边际信誉成本高于大企业,因此它通常成为“界定”的对象。解决该问题的途径在于降低信息搜集与处理的成本,而这集中表现在两条路径上即“中小金融机构思路”与“信用担保思路”。在“中小金融机构思路”下,着眼于利润最大化的银行实现的只能是从自身收益最大化角度出发的单一的、局部的均衡。然而,社会总体福利均衡要求具有同等边际收益的大企业与中小企业能够获得相同的金融支持。因此要提高社会福利、实现局部均衡向总体均衡的收敛,就必须通过降低信息成本使大企业与中小企业的边际信誉成本趋于一致。中小企业信用担保机构正是通过降低对中小企业信息搜集与处理的边际信息成本,以增加信用供给,进而降低中小企业融资的整体风险水平,使得信贷配给的均衡位置发生位移,促使局部均衡向社会总体福利均衡收敛。在理论分析的基础上,通过构建信用担保制度的模型,说明在非盈利性等假设前提下,构建多层次的信用担保机构能够一定程度转移和缓解银行通常面临的逆向选择和道德风险问题,扩大信贷交易规模,提高社会福利。联系我国实际情况,信用担保机构虽然在我国存续多年,但在发展过程中仍存在一定的制度缺陷。针对这些缺陷,提出我国应构建以互助性担保机构为主体,政策性担保机构和商业性担保机构为补充的框架体系,并从担保机构模式的选择、担保机构的层次结构以及风险管理几个方面提出了一些规范我国中小信用担保机构发展的对策和建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Through doing research on the small and medium enterprises’(SME’s) finance difficulty from the angle of credit rationing, the author finds that the fundamental reason for SME’s finance difficulty is the high marginal information cost of SME when it was compared to large enterprises. There are two ways to reduce the cost for finding and dealing with the information. One is the“small and medium financial institutions option”; the other is the“credit guarantee option”. The first option is not the best one because the bank whose goal is to maximize its profit only can realize the single and partial equilibrium. However, the whole social welfare equilibrium requires the large enterprises and SME with the same marginal returns should enjoy equal financial support. In order to make the partial equilibrium close to the whole equilibrium and enhance the social welfare, the information cost should be reduced to make the marginal information cost of large enterprises and that of SME equal. The credit guarantee institutions (CGIs) for SME increase the credit supply through reducing the marginal information cost. As a result of it, the whole risk level of SME is reduced at the same time and the position of credit rationing equilibrium is also moved to make the partial equilibrium close to the whole equilibrium.On the basis of theory analysis, a model on credit guarantee is built to show that CGIs can solve the usual adverse selection and moral hazard problem which the bank always face under several hypotheses, such as non-profit, etc. The author also reviews the stats quo of the development of CGIs in China and does some researches on the institutional limitations of the existed CGIs. He suggests that the framework that the mutual credit guarantee institutions should be the principal part and the non-profit and commercial CGIs are the supplemental part should be built up in China. At last, he makes some suggestions on the development of CGIs from several aspects.更多还原