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合同农业中农户机会主义行为的治理研究

The Study of the Governance to Peasants’ Opportunistic Behaviors in Contract Farming

【作者】 罗丙能

【导师】 周德翼;

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 , 产业经济学, 2006, 硕士

【副题名】来自深圳嘉农公司的案例分析

【摘要】 合同农业是我国农业产业化过程中推动农副产品市场化改革而出现的一种制度创新,是衔接“小农户、大市场”的桥梁,对于增加农民收入有着重要的促进作用。本文运用案例研究法,通过对深圳嘉农公司一生产基地的实地调查和研究,得出了以下结论及有待进一步检验的命题:(1)合同农业中对农户机会主义行为的治理既包括显性规则也包括隐性规则,既有事前的激励,也有事中的控制,还有事后的管理,充分说明了现实世界中的治理结构是一个精致的复合体。多种规则/制度的共同作用使农户不采取机会主义行为比实行机会主义行为更有利,由此形成了一个能够超越囚徒困境的有效纳什均衡,实现各参与方(公司、片长、农户)的合作而达成了多方共赢的局面。(2)把生产中的控制权配置给最有能力治理农户的代理人/中介,并充分实现其与公司各自专有知识的合作是合同农业中成功治理农户的重要条件。(3)充分运用农户的社会资本能够有效降低公司和代理人/中介治理农户的交易成本。(4)对农户的成功治理,取决于各种治理规则/制度能为利益相关者(公司、片长、农户)创造经济租金并妥善分配经济租金,以满足利益相关者的参与约束和激励兼容约束。

【Abstract】 The contract farming is a creative system to promote the reform of farm and sideline products to adapt to the market changes in the process of agricultural industrialization。It gets the access to connect the small household farmers and the large market and plays a key role in increasing farmers’ income。In this article, through studying some cases and investigating and doing on-spot research of Jianong Firm in Shenzhen City, we have gotten the following conclusions as well as some concepts needing to be examined: (1) In contract farming, the governance to opportunistic behaviors among peasants includes not only explicit rules but also some implicit rules。The encouragement before happening, the control in the processing and the management afterwards have been fully showed in it。This completely indicates that the structure of governance in reality is very complex。 The common function of various rules and institutions makes peasants get more from not carrying out opportunistic behaviors than doing。Due to this, the efficient Nash equilibrium exceeding prisoners’ dilemma comes into being。And a multiple-win situation has been achieved because of the cooperation of all the participators including the firm, agents and farmers。(2) It is a significant precondition of managing peasants successfully in the contract farming to put the controlling rights of production to the most capable agents or brokerages and realize the cooperation between them and the firm。(3) It will effectively help reduce the transaction cost of company and the agent or brokerages when managing peasants if they fully take advantage of the peasants’ social capital。(4) The successful governance to the household fanners depends on the rules or institutions that can produce and allocate economic rent perfectly for each participator to satisfy the stake-holders’(the firm, the agents and the households) incentive compatibility constrain and participation constrain。

  • 【分类号】F320
  • 【被引频次】8
  • 【下载频次】347
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