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非正式制度与农户借贷行为研究
Research of Informal Institution and the Credit Behavior of Peasant Households
【作者】 纪志耿;
【导师】 蒋永穆;
【作者基本信息】 四川大学 , 政治经济学, 2006, 硕士
【摘要】 2004和2006年中共中央和国务院发布的两个“1号文件”都对农民增收和农村建设问题给予极大的关注。其中在深化农村改革部分,都提到了改革和创新农村金融体制的内容。鼓励有条件的地方,在严格监管、有效防范金融风险的前提下,通过吸引社会资本和外资,积极兴办直接为“三农”服务的多种所有制的金融组织。大力培育由自然人、企业法人或社团法人发起的小额信贷组织,引导农户发展资金互助组织,规范民间借贷。从这些文件可以看出,创新农村金融体制、兴办贴近农户的金融组织、规范民间借贷,已成为农民增收和新农村建设的一项重要任务。那么,作为农村金融中一种重要组织形式的农户借贷,是依靠什么制度保证其节约信息成本和交易费用的优势,其中的村庄信任又是如何构建的,农户借贷行为有具有那些动态演变趋势?对这些问题的深入研究和回答,无疑对新时期做好农村金融工作具有重大的指导意义。 本文共分为六章。第一章是对农户借贷过程中非正式制度的研究,指出了非正式制度的构成并分析了该类制度的功能。第二章运用了一个完全信息动态博弈的模型,对农户借贷过程中村庄信任机制的构建进行研究,提出在长期合作中建立信任、团体贷款中建立信任、抵押担保中建立信任、互联交易中建立信任等四种村庄信任构建机制。第三章着重分析了非正式制度对农户借贷行为的影响,从农户借贷动机、借贷用途和借贷模式三个方面将二者有机地结合起来。第四章从历史韵视角出发,研究了中华民国时期、新中国建立后的合作化和公社化时期、改革开放后的八九十年代、九十年代末至新世纪初期和两个“1号文件”出台后这五个历史阶段农户的借贷动机,并指出其内在的动态演变规律。第五章参照新古典经济学中的效用函数模型,分析了农户借贷用途中偏好
【Abstract】 The two "documents No.1" made by the CPC Central Committee and State Council in 2004 and 2006 both paid great attention to the increasing of farmer’s income and the construction of countryside. And in the part of rural reform, the two documents both talked about the innovation of rural financial mechanism. It is suggested in the documents that establishing all kinds of rural financial organizations actively, fostering micro credit organizations which were funds by persons, enterprises and groups, leading rural households to develop financial funds, and regulating the private credits. From these documents, we can see that it has become an important task to innovate our rural financial system, foster rural financial organizations that are close to the peasants, and regulate the private credits. So, it is meaningful for us to answer the questions such as how the organizations of peasant credit economize the information cost and inspecting expense thus availably, how the village confidence is formed, and how the behavior in the process of peasant credit develops.This text is divided into six chapters totally. Chapter one makes a research into the informal institutions in the credit process of peasant households, pointing out the contents and functions of the institution. Chapter two focus on the ways to establish the village confidence mechanism making use of the is a model of complete and dynamic information game, putting forward four measures for it, such as building up the trust in long- term cooperation, through the group loan or mortgaging guarantee, and achieving it through interactive trades. Chapter three emphasize the relationship between the informal institution and the credit behavior of peasant households,
- 【网络出版投稿人】 四川大学 【网络出版年期】2007年 03期
- 【分类号】F832.4
- 【被引频次】10
- 【下载频次】784