基于SSR模型的横向并购研究

【作者】 胡金庚；

【导师】 李仕明；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 各国政府以导致垄断从而降低社会福利的名义限制横向并购,并相继出台了相关的反垄断法。但20世纪90年代中叶以来,一些明显有悖于各国反垄断法的横向并购不仅没有遭到政府的反对和阻扰,反而得到了政府的支持。在我国,随着加入WTO和我国的经济结构转变,横向并购研究显得尤为重要。本文以博弈论为工具,通过放宽SSR模型市场竞争结构,拓展SSR模型企业并购后的行为模式,考虑并购企业并购之后生产能力不足的情况,分析了横向并购的动机和效应。首先,从经济理论的角度剖析了各种企业并购动因理论;其次,简要介绍了基于横向并购的SSR模型及各国学者对其的扩展;再次,基于一些新的假设对横向并购进行了研究,探讨了各种企业横向并购的动机和效应问题,并且对我国上市公司的横向并购进行简单实证,而且用波音公司并购麦道公司案例来说明研究结论;最后对本文研究做出总结。得到主要结论如下:当横向并购产生优势企业时,原先市场的领导层企业数目不等于零时,横向并购动机存在,而且在一定条件下,这种横向并购会使社会福利增加,这正是横向并购得到支持的原因所在;当横向并购不产生上优势企业时,动机存在的条件极为苛刻,基本上与不产生优势企业的假设相违背,可以认为这种并购的动机不存在,而且这种并购导致产品价格上升,社会总福利降低;如果市场近似古诺竞争市场,并购后并购方生产能力不能满足理论上的最优产量,只要其生产能力超过并购前参与并购各方的最优产量之和,那么并购动机就会存在,而且横向并购会导致产品价格下降,社会总福利上升;当处于高层次的企业并购低层次企业时,由于并购者不能获利或者未参与并购者获利增加比并购方多,并购动机不存在或者很微弱。本文在力求在深化对企业横向并购的理论认识的同时,也能为企业横向并购的实践提供一定程度的指导。更多还原

【Abstract】 The governments of various countries limit horizontal merger in the name of resulting in monopolizing to reduce social welfare, have issued relevant antimonopoly laws in succession. But from middle period of the 1990’, some horizontal merger which was obviously contrary to the antimonopoly laws hadn’t been opposed , had got support from government instead. In our country ,with the economic structure transformation and joining in WTO, studying of horizontal merger seems particularly important.This paper regards game theory as tools, through relaxing the market competition structure of SSR model, expanding the behavior pattern after merging of SSR model enterprise, considering the situation with insufficient production capacity after enterprises merging, have analyzed motive and effect of horizontal merger. First of all , I dissect various motive theory of merge; Secondly , introduce SSR model based on horizontal merger and expansion of it of scholars of various countries briefly; Moreover, research motives and effect of horizontal merger based on some new assumption, carry on the simple real example to the horizontal merger of the listed company of our country , and explain the conclusion of studying through the case of merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Companies; finally ,Summarize on this text.Get the main conclusion as follows: When producing advantage enterprises in horizontal merger, if the figure of leaders enterprise don’t equal to zero, the horizontal merger motive exists, and under certain condition, this kind of horizontal merger will increase the social total welfare , this is exactly the reason why horizontal merger gets support; When horizontal merger does not produce advantage enterprises , the condition that the motive exists is extremely harsh, and this kind of merger rises the product price and reduce the social total welfare; When the market is Couront market, If merging side’s production capacity after merge can’t reach optimum in theories satisfied, so long as its production capacity exceed the sum of optimum output of merger participate, merge motive exists, and horizontal merger will increase the social total welfare rises; When high-level enterprises merge low level enterprises, because merging side can’t get profit or those don’t participate in merger get more profit than merging side, motive更多还原