【作者】 蔡碧红；

【导师】 陈共荣；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 公司治理与内部控制一直以来都是理论界和实务界所关注的重点课题之一。有关公司治理与内部控制的关系,目前主要有两种观点:一种观点认为,公司治理与内部控制是制度环境与内部控制系统的关系,即所谓的“制度环境论”;另一种观点则认为,公司治理与内部控制应该是互动关系。本文更赞同后一种观点。 企业是一系列契约的合约体。公司治理与内部控制作为契约体内两种制度安排,二者的互动基础主要体现在以下四个方面:渊源的一致性、载体的统一性、理论基础的耦合性以及内容的交叉性。剩余控制权的有效配置不但是理解企业治理结构的一把钥匙,而且是实施内部控制的关键所在,因此,它理应是公司治理与内部控制互动的逻辑起点。公司治理机制的不断完善,能促使内部控制外部化,促进内部控制供需趋向均衡,优化企业内部审计约束机制。反过来,内部控制的不断完善能增强企业契约的完备性,优化资本市场、产品市场等公司外部治理机制,能使企业内部的激励约束机制更有成效。公司治理与内部控制良性互动的直接结果有二,即制度效率的提高和企业核心竞争力的增强。 在转轨经济中,国有企业“一股独大”致使内部人控制问题无法避免,这正是导致国有企业治理结构与内部控制互动系统陷入低效均衡的主要原因。而从外因上看,有效会计信息需求主体的缺失对公司治理与内部控制陷入恶性互动起了推波助澜的作用。本文认为,促使国有企业治理结构与内部控制实现良性互动的关键在于控制内部人控制,并应从完善证券市场基础制度缺陷、加强投资者关系管理及完善经营者薪酬激励制度三个主要方面着手。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate governance and internal control are two of the most important topics in the theoretical fields and practical fields. Currently, There are mainly two kinds of views on the relations between corporate governance and internal control: one of that is "the system-environment theory"; another states that the relationship should be interactive. This thesis approves the latter one.The firm is a nexus of contracts. As two kinds of systematic arrangements inside the contractual entity, the foundation of the interactivity between corporate governance and internal control mainly embodies in four aspects: consistency of the originating, the same carrier, the same theories foundation and crossed contents. As the effective installing of residual control rights is not only the key to comprehend the governance structure, but also the key to implement the internal control, it is certainly the logic point of departure of the interaction. The governance mechanisms’ unceasing completeness can externalize the internal control, make the balance of the supply and demand of internal control and improve the internal audit restraint mechanisms. On the other hand, the unceasing perfection of internal control mechanisms can strengthen the completeness of the contracts, improve the external governance mechanisms and make the internal incentive and restraint mechanisms more effective. Their positive interaction can bring two results directly, the exaltation of system efficiency and enterprise’ core competencies.During the transmission economy, excessively high ratio of the state-owned share leads to the insider control problems unavoidable, this is the main reason for the invalid balance of the interaction system. Another reason is the valid accounting information demanders’ depletion from the outside. This thesis put forward several suggestions to control the insider control problems, which is the key to realize the positive interaction, including completing the regime defect of stock market, enhancing the management of investors’ relationship, and completing the executives’ salary system.更多还原