【作者】 熊芳；

【导师】 黄晓艳；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 价格结构问题是银行卡产业发展的瓶颈之一,研究银行卡产业中的价格结构将丰富现有的双边市场的价格理论,并有助于解决实践中银行卡产业垄断价格问题。银行卡产业中确定价格结构的难点在于银行卡产业中的不可内部化间接网络外部性的存在。本研究具体运用模型研究、对比研究与案例研究的研究方法,结合传统多重定价理论和新兴的双边网络市场的价格理论,对原有的银行卡产业定价模型进行补充和修改,给出了研究银行卡产业价格结构的统一框架,并分析不同市场结构和不同目标下的价格结构确定及其影响。 理论研究和模型研究的结果表明垄断性银行卡支付网络条件下利润最大化的消费者和商户间价格结构取决于其各自需求价格弹性和需求价格交叉弹性的相对大小,而福利最大化的价格结构在其考虑需求价格弹性基础上再考虑消费者和商户的期望效用的相对大小;对比分析,两者契合的条件是消费者和商户的效用函数同分布。而双寡头支付网络对称竞争条件下利润最大化的价格结构除却以上因素外,还需要考虑消费者的网络忠诚度。相对于垄断性支付网络而言对称性双寡头支付网络倾向于消费者较低比率而商户较高比率的价格结构;只有当消费者绝对终于固定的支付网络时,其价格结构与垄断条件下完全相同。而在消费者忠诚度非零时,非对称的双寡头支付网络其根据自己的消费者容积所带来的市场势力确定的价格结构最大化支付网络利润和消费者剩余,忽略商户方的利益,从而导致过少的商户数量。在理论和模型研究的基础上结合中国具体实践进行案例研究,表明突破中国银行卡产业中的价格结构瓶颈必须要通过改善支付环境提高支付效率、市场细分和改变支付者的支付偏好来促进银行卡产业的发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Price structure is a bottleneck in the development of the bankcard industry. Research on price structure in the bankcard industry is of great value to current two-sided market research theoretically, and can help solve the monopoly price problem in practice. The difficulty of price structure research comes from unendogenetic indirect network externalities in this bankcard two-sided market. Through theoretic analysis, model innovation, antitheses and case study, this paper presents a systemic and feasible framework to study price structure in bankcard industry by integrating traditional multi-pricing theory with burgeoning two-sided market pricing theory.Within a monopoly platform to maximize its total profit, the main determinants of equilibrium price structure are (i) the relative size of demand-price elasticity, and (ii) the relative size of cross-group externality. And the expected intra-marginal utility is added when the purpose is to maximize the whole social welfare. To make these two price structure coincide, the variable utility of customers and merchants should hold the same distribution function.Within symmetrical duopoly market structure, the price structure is determined by (i) the relative size of demand-price elasticity, and (ii) the relative size of cross-group externality, and (iii) the customers’ loyalty about certain platform, which makes the platform charge customers less and charge merchants more. And when the duopoly platforms are asymmetrical in customers’ demand volume, platforms try to make money from their market power, in which price structure would lead to more merchants’ resistance and less bankcard transaction.At last, on the basis of theoretic research, the case of merchants’ resistance to ChinaUnionpay in Shenzhen is studied. By analyzing the incentive of merchants’ resistance and the bankcard industry of China, the way to break through the price structure bottleneck is found: (i) improving the use condition, (ii) changing consumers’ payment habit, and (iii) fractionizing the consumers and merchants.更多还原