【作者】 郎颖；

【导师】 张海晏；

【作者基本信息】 宁夏大学 ， 马克思主义理论与思想政治教育， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 企业所有权是指企业的剩余索取权和剩余控制权,它具有状态随机依存的性质。企业所有权安排的基本原则是企业剩余控制权与剩余索取权的安排相互对应。从企业所有权理论演进的历史与现实考察,企业所有权制度安排的趋势必然是沿着实现人力资本产权特征的方向发展。现实情况是控制权与剩余索取权在国有企业内部不相匹配。在我国,国家作为国有企业剩余索取权法律上的拥有者对企业承担最后风险,但是国家却不能对企业实施规范有效的控制,企业控制权中绝大部分实际上都落入企业内部人,尤其是经理人员的手中;从另一方面看,国有企业经理人员作为最难监控,最具私人信息优势的群体,却并不拥有法律所明确规定的剩余索取权,并且国有企业经理报酬普遍偏低。作为国有企业代理人的经理人员就很难有动力和热情去关心企业长期发展,确保国有资产的保值增值。与之相反,他们往往会利用手中的控制权,实现更多的巨额工资外收益(隐性收入),可见,控制权与剩余索取权不相匹配以及国有企业的代理人的低报酬现象,会导致国有企业效率的低下、“内部人控制”等问题。强调人力资本的产权作用,完善国有企业的治理结构则是解决这一问题的有效途径。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the modern joint-stock company, the property right structure is arranged like this :ownership and control are separated and it is proved to be efficient. But in the state-owned enterprises in China, the efficiency is very slow. There are so many reasons such as the many workers , behineded equipments and so on. While the most important reason is the unsymmetry of the property right structure. The property structure has two parts: residual rights of control and claim to residue. Only when they are arranged reasonably, the enterprise can reach its aim: full profit. But in fact, in the state-owned enterprises in China, the residual rights of control and claim to residue are not harmonious. The mangers and the directors haven’t the claim to residue. Scarce of the incentive, They aren’t care for the production , not speak to the profit.On the contrary, they try their best to get much from the enterprise during their post.So, the reform to the stated-owned enterprises in China should pay more attention to the property rights structure. Not only the residual rights of control, but also the claim to residue should be given to mangers and directors as incentive. At last, we still admit the function of the human capital and optimize the Company’s administration structure.更多还原