【作者】 陈春良；

【导师】 罗卫东；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 硕士

【副题名】兼论法权与经济权利的分离及其对交易的影响

【摘要】 本文通过对已有的经济学文献对偷窃和窃品问题研究的回顾,认为虽然用标准的新古典经济学范式分析这个问题,能够在有关偷窃的社会成本、不同法律规定下偷窃这一行为的个人和社会成本差异,以及偷窃规制对社会福利最大化的影响等方面,针对偷窃供给方角度得出一系列的规制建议,但是经典文献却罕有涉及窃品交易,对窃品交易的价格形成问题的探讨更是“凤毛麟角”。 从新制度经济学的产权范式出发,本文认为窃品交易之所以可能的关键在于法权与经济权利的差异。法权是需要法律体系认定、证成或否定的,而经济权利却是和事实上的占用相联系。窃品交割完成到最终法权瑕疵被认定的一段法权时滞里,不具有法权所有的买方可以从事实占有上获得一定的经济收入流。由于政府法律体系的生产效率、社会资本因素以及物品本身物理特性差别,特定时期具体地区的法权识别服务生产水平是有差异的。也就反映了法权时滞和法权瑕疵被发现的可能性大小不同。所以,理性买方将愿意为法权瑕疵的窃品支付一定的对价以获取在法权时滞内的经济权利收入流。窃品供给方实施偷窃行为又有一定的成本耗费,并且需要一定的风险贴水。在最终的静态讨价还价博弈中,窃品买卖双方将从各自对窃品的预估价格出发,可能达成一个精致的窃品交易契约。 法权识别服务水平的差异影响了法权时滞的长短和发现概率,而这将直接反映在窃品成交价格上。窃品价格反映了买卖双方从合作的窃品交易中,剥夺到的原所有者所有权租金的大小。所有权租金规模及其在窃品买卖双方中的分成比例,将对双方产生不同的行为激励。从动态角度看,这将导致不同的窃品交易规模和偷窃行为的供给。摒弃偷窃和生产策略的价值判断,本文认为,从简单的投票机制和法权演进过程看,大规模偷窃可能对新一轮的法权规则有影响,甚至改写法权规则从而使得偷窃合法化。因此,从一个静态的窃品价格形成机制假说出发,我们的分析框架对原始法权形成和演进的理解将有所启发。更多还原

【Abstract】 Theft is a rather old crime, which traditionally studied mainly by criminology and jurisprudence. The very first research concerning the economic impact of theft began with GS.Becker, the so-called economics imperialist. Since then multiple efforts have been devoted to analyze the individual and social cost under different rule sets, and the adverse effect of theft to social welfare. However, few words had been said about the stolen goods market, and even fewer researchers had shown any concern about the concrete price forming mechanism of this special market, which is of great significance to sweep off theft crime from the buyer side or the market reduction approach.Thus, we will, in the paper, try to outline the fundamental price operating manner in a stolen goods market. After firstly introducing a hypothesis regarding the stolen goods price mechanism that the legitimate lag between legitimate right and economic rights stands to be the very reason why the trade of stolen goods, which is illegal for both sides is initially possible, our paper will offer out a formal analytical price model. We argue that the initial evaluation of potential buyer and seller about the targeting stolen goods in a given time point just reflects distinct efficiency and performance of local government, social capital, and the physical characteristic of the goods, which lately brings along different stimulant for the two parties’ behavior and in the end results in different theft amount.The lag duration, which makes trade talk possible, also convinces the reason buyer that it might be profitable to pay for the stolen economic rights lease. Prosperity of theft strategy and trade of stolen goods in a particular area may accordingly erode the legitimate rule set established by the ruling party by forming up a collective acting mechanism. From this dynamic view, some clues regarding the origin and also evolution of legitimate right can be found in our model.更多还原