【作者】 冯颖；

【导师】 朱启明；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来，我国资本市场中控股股东侵害中小股东利益的案件不断涌现，引发了人们对控股股东与中小股东间委托代理问题的关注。而纵观现有的相关研究，多偏重于从问题的某一角度展开，总体上并未形成一套完整的体系。鉴于我国股权结构的特殊性及相关法律保护的不足，我国上市公司控股股东与中小股东间的利益冲突将比其他国家更加复杂。因此，对控股股东与中小股东代理问题进行系统的研究，有着重要的理论和现实意义。 事实上，世界上大部分国家的企业股权不是高度分散而是相当集中的，则因“两权分离”而引发的代理问题的重心就会由经理层和所有者之间的利益冲突转向控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。公司治理是外部投资者藉以防止权利被内部人“掠夺”的一套机制，其完善程度决定了对控股股东利益侵占行为进行制约的有效性。而鉴于股权结构与法律保护对公司治理运作效率的决定性作用，我们认为，上述两者是影响公司控股股东行为的根本制度因素。这实际上为如何解决控股股东和中小股东代理问题提供了着眼点。具体到中国的资本市场，我们发现，控股股东对中小股东的“掠夺”是最为严重的代理问题，与此同时，以股权结构与法律保护为基点，对我国控股股东侵占能力和侵占动机的考察，也同样证明：我国当前的核心代理问题存在于控股股东与中小股东之间。最后，本文分别基于公司治理的微观层面和外部机制视角，即从股权结构优化和法律保护完善两方面出发，对如何解决我国控股股东与中小股东间的代理问题提出了若干建议。 本文融合了财务学、经济学及法学的相关知识，力图在以下的方面有所创新：(1)按照伯利—米恩斯命题下所有者与管理者间代理问题的研究模式，详尽地分析了股权集中下的公司核心代理问题：控股股东和中小股东间的代理问题；(2)将LLSV模型中的影响因素扩展到所有公司治理机制，从成本——收益的角度分析了公司治理机制与控股股东行为间的制约关系，并提出：股权结构和法律保护是控股股东与中小股东间代理问题的关键制度因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the case that the controlling shareholders encroach on minority stockholders’ interests is emerging constantly in our country’s capital market, and it causes people to concern themselves with the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. If you make a general survey of existing relevant researches, however, you will find most of them emphasize only one aspect of the problem and have not formed a set of complete systems on the whole. In view of the particularity of the ownership structure in our country and the deficiency in relevant legal protections, the interest conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders in our listed companies is more complicated than those of other countries. So, it is of great theoretical and realistic meanings for us to study this agency problem systematically.In fact, most enterprises’ ownerships are not highly dispersed but quite concentrated in the world, therefore the focus of the agency problem, which is caused by the separation between ownership and control, turns from interest conflicts between owners and managers to those between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. As we know, corporate governance is the mechanism by which outside investors can prevent their rights being robbed by insiders, and its perfection degrees determine whether the behavioral restriction, which is against controlling shareholders’ encroachment on interests, is effective or not. On the basis of the ownership structure and legal protection’s determination effects on the corporate governance’s operational efficiency, we think these two things are the basic institutional factors which influence companies’ controlling shareholders’ behaviors. And this provides a starting point for us to solve the agency problem between controlling shareholders and in minority stockholders. When it comes to the capital market in China, we find that the controlling shareholders’ robbery of minority stockholders is the most serious agency problem. At the same time, the investigation of our controlling shareholders’ abilities and motives to encroach, which is based on ownership structure and legal protection, has also proved that our key agency problem exists between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders presently. Finally, this thesis provides several suggestions respectively from the points of view of corporate governance’ micro aspects and external mechanisms, namely the optimization of ownership structure and legal protection.The thesis combines the knowledge of finance, economics and laws, trying to innovate in the following aspects : (1)According to the mode of the agency problem between the owners and managers under Berle-Means’ proposition, the thesis analyses exhaustively the key agency problem of concentrated companies, that is to say the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders; (2)By applying the influencing factors in the model of LLSV to all corporate governance mechanisms, this thesis analyses the restriction relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and controlling shareholders’ behaviors from the angel of economic feasibility, and then puts forward that legal protection and ownership structure are the key institutional factors in solving the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders.更多还原