论公司并购中利益相关者的权利平衡与股东权保护

【作者】 尹红；

【导师】 单飞跃；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 经济法， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 以往对公司并购中股东权的保护是从狭义的公司治理结构——股东会、董事会和监事会三权分立的结构——入手，大多以“股东权保护”为题，以突出公司并购给股东，尤其是小股东带来的负面影响，并着重设计对此进行规制的制度。本文认为，将公司看作是股东的公司是对现实中的公司制度的片面理解。同时，传统的公司治理结构已经不符合现代公司的发展。因此，有必要从一个新的角度去讨论公司并购中的股东权问题。本文以对公司法和权利的经济分析为基础，参考了现代公司法理论对公司治理结构问题新的研究成果，对公司并购过程中的股东权利问题进行了整体的分析。一个重要的基础性的观点是，公司是一个由众多利益相关者共同参与的一个组织，参与各方的利益密切相关。对其中一方权利的讨论，必然涉及到该方与其他主体之间的权利平衡，因为有人得到，就会有人失去。本文认为，对权利平衡这一问题的解决办法，不应该是简单地制止损害的行为，因为问题具有相互性(利益的互相冲突)，所以，问题的关键应该是如何去避免较严重的损害。因而，讨论公司并购过程中的股东权利，就是讨论股东与其他利益相关者之间的权利平衡，寻求在当事人之间正确地配置权利义务的方法。而经济学的研究已经为我们解决这一问题提供了很好的工具，那就是剩余索取权和剩余控制权尽量对应的原则。这样的权利平衡方法被证明是有效率的，也是我们需要通过公司治理结构所要确立的。同时，法学界对于权利的现代分析也为我们正确地理解股东权提供了很有价值的参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 With regarding to the protection of the shareholders’ rights in the M&A, the previous discussions are usually began with the narrow-sensed corporation internal management structure, which consists of 3 separate functions as the shareholders’ meetings, board of directors and board of supervisors. Those discussions focus on the negative influence of the M&A on the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, and emphasize the re-design of regulations to stipulate the M&A. However, in the view of this thesis, taking the corporation as the shareholders’ corporation is far from an overall understanding of the contemporary corporation system. At the same time, the traditional corporation internal management structure is no longer in accordance with the contemporary corporation development. As a result, it is necessary to discuss the protection of the shareholders’ rights in the M&A from an entirely new angle. Based on the corporation law and the economic analysis on rights, and with reference to the up-to-date research fruits in the field of utilizing the theory of contemporary corporation law to study the issue of corporation internal management structure, the thesis gives an integrated analysis on the problems of shareholders’ rights during the M&A. A fundamental and important standpoint is that a corporation is an organization with numerous participants whose interests are closely interrelated. Any discussion on the rights of one party will consequently involve the rights equilibrium between the party and the other subjects of the rights. For one gains means the others lose. The thesis believes that the key point of the solution to the problem of rights equilibrium, should be how to avoid severer damages, instead of simply prohibiting damaging behaviors, for all the problems are interrelated (on account of the confliction among the shareholders). Therefore, the discussion of the shareholders’ rights in the M&A, is essentially the discussion of the rights equilibrium between the shareholders and other interested parties, and try to find the right way to allocate rights and commitments among parties concerned. The economics researches have provided us very useful tools to deal with the problem, which is, the residual claiming right should correspond to the residual controlling right to the utmost. The approach of the rights equilibrium, which has been proved efficient, is what we need to be applied to when structuring the corporation internal management. At the same time, the contemporary juridical research on the topic is also very helpful for us tounderstand shareholders’ rights properly.更多还原